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This thesis is m attempt to ev"aluate the attitude of the Athenian

demos during the tormative years of the Cleisthenian democracy.
The dissertation tries to trace the events of the period from the mpul-

sion of Hippian to the

~ttle

sequence can be foll.amtd..

of Sal.amis.

Ma.tural.ly no strict chronological

The events are known to us only f'ragmen~.

some additional archaeological Wormation has trickled dcmn to us 1n the
last tro decad.all 11h1ch shed light on the edating historical data prO\Tided
ma:1nly by Herodotus md Arletotle.

-

On other instanc• the argument ax

eilentio is empl.C)Jed to supplement the tactual mt.erial.

The exam:lnation of the period demonstrates that thc:re wre two strong

trends prevalent 1n the lite of the Athan.an Democra.oy1 a moderate and m

extremist. The sucaesa ot the Cleisthenian reforms

1n11S

main]¥ dDe to the

moderate tone of his leg:lalation. Cle1.athenes 1 tlto knew the Athenians veU,

realized that he had to keep the political. atmosphere "cool,• i t his
bad my chance

tor auooess. This is the

re£ort.W

md. n reum he deliberately avoided

to indulge in the application of oatraoism a.gal Zl8t the relatives of the Piaiatratids.
.t'anaticism

¥ihen Cleisthenes passed out of the political scene, political
f!):'SV1

graduall\f' md became

Athenians conm.ttect.

the cause for the blunde:rs 'Ill ioh the

New men md nar ia!JU.e8 appeared around

divided the voters deepl;r.

In the midst

500 B.c.

which

ot the critical situation the Athen-

18Zl8 acted erraticall;r• They fat.led to formulate my policies that could be
characterized either
ed. the cris1.a of

490,

as.U-thou.~ht

out or consistent.

Once they bad weather...

they lapsed again to petty hatreds and personal animoai-

2
ties which further divided

them.

when greater unity was needed in the face

of the grave danger which atill threatened them from ·the East. They gave
vent to their pettiness

~

emplayine; the instifu:tlon of oetraoism for the

elimination of their political opponents. Ostracism, which was invented
by Cleisthenes for the protection o:t democra..oy1 was now used by the majOl\ioo

ity as a political ftD.pon agai.nst the leadership ot the minority. As a

result, politioal intolenmoei.-.so fateful to the Oreoks-ns inoreaeed, aid
inatead o£ the Mends o£ the tyrants, the friends md relatives o:t the

inventor

ot ostracism wwe

ban:Lahed.

It Greece was .finally saved 1n 4801

thil was chietl\v due to that maver,5.ck 1h o bore part of the responeibility

tor the eventa of the previows deoade1 'l'hem18tooles. In the hour of
Greece's extreme perll1 he applied his mpromely practical. genius aid h1s

bnlliant foresight for the aalvation of Greece. The political Vices

which

~ed

the Atheniam before Salamis continued. to do"'. them through-

out their lite• Needless to eq that the same Vices atnicted all the
Greeks.

Their aelf was their WI rst erlellV•

Had they subt'ned their sel.£1

the face of the Ancient Neal- East m uld have been different todlv'.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been said that individuals who forgive themselves
little mistakes often end up forgiving their big mistakes as well
with deleterious effects.

The same thing is true about nations.

Among them the Greeks have overindulged in this practice with
nefarious results on their own political existence.

Western

scholars, dazzled b7 the striking accomplishments of the Greeks,
have often tended to forgive them their political excesses and to
disregard Greek political foibles.

The7 often approach Greek

political histor7 with an aura of awe.

And 7et the face of the

whole Near East would have been different if the Greeks had mastered the art of self-rule.
this facet of
behavior.

histo~

This paper is an effort to exemplif7

and the inconsistenc7 of Greek political

The period 510-480 B.C. is important because it is the

formative period in Athenian Deaocrac7 and because of the response of that Democrac7 to the dangers that threatened her from
the outside.

There is no intention here to rehash the old argu-

ments about the Cleisthenian reforms.

These have been thorough17

investigated b7 scholars and nothing definitive can be said unless new evidence appears--an unlikel1 thing.
is the problem of ostracism.

The onl7 exception

Since this question is indispensa-

ble to this work I had to examine it in detail.

M7 purpose has

been to add my own insights to the period for whatever the1 are
worth.

If I have relied to a great

ture, this is due to the

tragmenta~

ext~nt

on historioal conjec-

nature of the information.

M1 onl7 defense is that I am not the onl7 sinner in this respect.

2

Inevita.bl1 a discussion on the period has to revolve primaril1 on Herodotus.

He is indispensable, but not satisfactory.

Herodotus makes reference to the domestic affairs of Athens during this period but only in passing.
Persian Wars.

His main interest is the

One would wish that in the place of the numerous

stories that he often narrates, he would have given us some pertinent information on the Athenian political scene.

Thuc1dides

has almost nothing to sa1 about this period except by accident.
Our richest source is Aristotle, or whoever wrote the Athenaion
Politeia that goes under his name.
scopes the events of the period.

But even this source teleBesides, it was written a cen-

tury and a half later and had to be based on others whose reliability escapes us.

Plutarch has a lot to sa1, but he too wrote

later and his information must be used with caution.

Other

fragmentary evidence is available but that does not enable us to
draw a definitive conclusion.

Recently, archaeological evidence

has been produced which is of great value for the historian of
this period.
Even though additional footnotes would have given a more
11

scholarl1" appearance to this paper, I have avoided excessive

documentation.

I footnoted only when absolutely necessary.

I wish to thank Dr. George Szemler for his valuable suggestions that consumed some of his invaluable time; the members
of the committee, the Reverend Thomas Bogan and Dr. Hana Gross,
who have examined this paper; and Mrs. Christine Karavites who
patientl1 typed and retyped the several drafts of this dissertation.

CHAPTER I
FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS

In the latter part of the first half of the sixth century,
B.c. 1 the political divisions in Athens led to some kind of a
coup which put an end briefly to the political bickering of the
Athenian factions. 2
The story of Herodotus about Pisistratus' wounds and beating was cleverly exaggerated and exploited by Pisistratus for his
political ends. 3

It led to the abolition of the constitution.

Thus it was the first time after the modern and compromising leg-

islation of Solom that the political extremism of the Greeks
1

All dates mentioned heretofore refer to the Before
Christ period unless otherwise indicated.
2

It seems that the coup of Pisistratus was symbolic in
some respects of the future trend of Hellenic politics, ancient
or modern. Whenever an impasse is reached because of the inability of the Greeks to bury temporarily, at least, their hatchets
and proceed with the normal business of the state, a "savior" appears who, in the name of "order," "law," ttnational dignity, 11 and
the "national good," undertakes to suspend or abolish the existing constitution and rule the state in a personal manner. To
this "rule" the exception had been the Spartans until their system too was undermined from internal and external developments
and caved in after the Battle of Mantinea. Socrates and Plato,
Thucydides, and others were not philo-Laconians. The1 simply admired the orderliness of the Spartan government and they violent11 disliked the weakness of their own government, a weakness
which mainly arose from the fact that any "fool" could decide the
affairs of the state without any prior knowledge and thought on
the business of state on which he was casting his vote. As long
as Pericles was to contain the crowd, the Athenian Democrac1,
without any strong checks and balances, somehow worked. But when
the voice of Pericles was eclipsed, the evils of the system or
rather the political weaknesses of the Greeks were made once
again manifest.
3Hdt I, 59,4.
Texts"), 14,1.

Aristotle, Ath. Pol. ("Oxford Classical

resulted in an unconstitutional solution of their political affairs.
Pisistratus must have realized that there was no other
way of implementing some of the program to which he was committed as the leader of the Poor Party, or of occupying the power to
which he openly aspired. 1 It is to his honor that once occupying
the government he used power with moderation thereby establishing
a precedent that was to be followed by almost all the revolutionary governments in Greece up to this day.
Once in control, Pisistratus proved to be a natural politician who understood power and knew how to use it.

He operated

from the beginning with a mixture of autocracy and measured democracy.
While Pisistratus' rule was not yet well rooted the erstwhile enemies of Pisistratus, themselves mutual enemies, were
temporarily reconciled; they formed a coalition and succeeded in
driving Pisistratus out of office. 2 But "it takes only a short
1
Charles Hignett, A__,H_.,s--.o~r~....,.;..-,;i;.;;;:;;-...,...~---..........--~._..,..,;;.a
to he End t the Fif
Centur B.C. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1952 , p. 109. The author speaks about the three parties of the
period. His explanation is at its best conjectural. He makes
the Hyperakrioi split away from the Paralioi. The Paralioi were
contented with Solon's reforms whereas the Hzperakrioi demanded
further Agrarian reforms. Bignett prefers the testimony of Herodotus (Hdt I, 59,3) over that of Plutarch (Plutarch, Solon 13,
1-2) who makes all these parties contemporaries. Other names for
the HlPerakrioi are Diakrioi (Ath. Pol. 13,4) and Epakrioi (Plutarch, Moralia ?63D).
2Bdt I, 59,6; Thuc. VI, 54,6; Ath. Pol. 14,1-2. Examples of the above statements are the government of Four Hundred,
Demetrius Phalereus, even the present government of Greece. A
notable exception is the government of the thirties after the
Peloponnesian War. The fact that they did not stay long in power

5
time to break up the intimacies of the base. 111

This political
s1111biosis could not last long, and the two were soon at odds. 2

Perhaps the overbearing Alcmeonids did not find their partner as
tractable as they wanted, and out of spite they upset the former
alliance of necessity only to form a similar one with the man
they had worked to expel.

The political "reconciliation" is

sealed with what they probably believed to be firmer bonds of
union.

A marriage was arranged between Pisistratus and Megacles'

daughter.3

The marriage was a marriage of convenience, and

Pisistratus, who probably did not trust the Alcmeonids anyway,
failed to consumate the "double marriage. 114

Once again the Ale-

meonids are estranged, and Pisistratus is forced to take to
flight because he lacked the strong basis that was needed and
without which he could not easily defy the strength of the Alcmeonids.

He is forced to flee for the second time.

His second

exile forces him to reconsider his position vis-A-vis the politiand that within that short period of time they left a legacy of
bitterness, indicates, in my mind, that they had violated the
protocol of revolutionary behavior. Also Thuc. VIII, 97,2.

61.€.A.uo-l••• • 11.c.C ~&~ ~tv ~WV qio:ui\wv OUVT).ftt:Co:s; 6A.Cyo~ xp6vo~
Isocra tes, On Dem9ndtSUlS I ("Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960). Hereafter all translations contained in this paper are from the Loeb Classical Library unless
otherwise indicated. Bdt I, 60,1; Ath. Pol. 14,3. Athenian
politics between 510--480 have been the object of many studies
conducted by scholars on both aides of the Atlantic. For a guide
to earlier bibliography see C. A. Robinson, Jr., "Athenian Politics 510-486," American Journal of Philologz, LXVI (1945), 243254.
2Hdt

I, 60,1

2; A.th. Pol. ll+,4.

3Hdt I, 61,1; Ath. Pol. 14,4.
4Hdt I,
61,1; Ath. Pol. 15,1.

6
cal realities in Athens.

It was clear to him that he ought to

broaden his basis, if he were to have an1 hopes of return.

He

therefore made alliances outside of Athens and acquired the economic independence that he needed to operate freel7. l

With a band

of mercenaries dependent on Pisistratus' pa1 he landed at Marathon and made his way to Athens with great ease. 2
of Pigs" operation in reverse.

It was a

0

Bay

The people in Athens were tired

of the political acrobatics of the Alcmeonids and the resultant
instabilit7 and disorder.

The1 were now ready to welcome a

change, and Pisistratus, who was probabl7 well apprized of the
political sentiment prevailing in Athens at that time, satisfied
the craving.

Herodotus sarcastically states:

"and while en-

camped there they were joined by their partisans from the cit1,
and by others who flocked to them from the country demes--men who
loved the rule of one more than freedom."3
only partl1 justifiable.

Herodotus• sarcasm is

In a "fine" manner he derides the Athe-

nians because they willingly exchanged their freedom for tyranny
--"men who loved the rule of one more than freedom."

He fails,

however, to note that the worst enemy of freedom and democracy is
political instability and disorder.

4 All the Athenians were

1Hdt I, 61,4; Atu. Po •• 15, 2-3·
2iJdt I, 62,l; 6th, fpl. 15, 4-5·
3Hdt I, 62,1 •

.•. ~voe

TOUTW TW xwpw cr~L crTpa~onEOEUOµEVOLUL
ot TE ~~ TOij ~cr~eo, UTQULWTaL ~nCx9vTo,~AAQL
TE1t¥,TWY OijUW~,npocrtcgeav. ~OLUL n ~upaVVLS
4
r~pu E.:/\.£1J{}Ep Lt'1' qv aanll ~o-rc:pov.
W. W, How and J. Wells, A Co111J1entar~ on Herodotus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), I, So. XtE: JC1. 8,4 and 1~ 1 10.
Hdt I, 29,2.

7
responsible for this chaotic situation that eventuated into tyranny and more so those who in their capacity as leaders bore on
their shoulders the greater weight of responsibility for the preservation of the public trust.

In this context, then, his friends,

the Alcmeonids, were directly responsible for the tyranny because
they had persistently cultivate a climate of political uncertainty.
Pisistratus was responsible for violating the Solonian
constitution twice before. 1

Solon's constitution made provisions

for the punishment of those who conspired for the overthrow of the
state through some kind or impeachment. 2 But then the others, and
especially the Alcmeonids, were equally responsible for the violation of the constitution not only as being guilty by association,
but because they were directly responsible for the anomalous situation which produced the violent solutions.

The people themselves

were guilty also because they did not care to argue about "fine"
constitutional points as long as their whims were satisfied.
Right now, they were simply tired of the political hegemony of the
erratic Alcmeonids and welcomed the change, even if it means a
violation of the constitution, a violation which they probably did
not see or care to regard.

It was a clear case of accepting an

antidote which led to the opposite extreme, the extreme of violating the legally established order.

The solution is so character-

1 Aristotle, Politics, 1315b.5.
2Ath, Pol. 8,4. Aristotle does not spell out the exact
provisions for the punishment of the offenders. He says that
Solon assigned to the Council of Areopagus the duty of superintending the laws, acting as before as the guardian of the constitution in general.

8
istic of the politically impatient and moody Greeks!
Here one should stop for a minute and pose the question:
What was the nature of the Athenian parties?

What was the rela-

tionship between the members of those parties and their leaders?
The pattern does not necessarily conform entirel1 to anything to
which we are accustomed.

It exhibits a peculiarit1 which is,

however, consonant with the Greek character, an inconsistenc7
which is consistent with the Greek nature.

Party differences

and principles are blurred and political behavior t;rpically atypical.

Did, for instance, Lycourgus and Megacles agree in principle

on the polic7 affecting their followers when they decided to remove Pisastratus from office?

We do not have details of their

dealings, and perhaps one could argue that they might have disagreed on policy, but they both agreed in principle against
t7rann7.

But then what of the covenant made by Pisistratus and

Megacles which resulted in the return of Pisistratus to power?
Again one could argue that Lycourgus and Megacles disagreed on
policy, and therefore the return of Pisistratus would be expedient to the followers of Megacles who, after all, stood to suffer
from the monopoly of power and privileges exercised by the members of the party led by Lycourgus.

But surely the behavior of

Megacles which resulted in the second expulsion of Pisistratus
stemmed from personal motives1 to which the followers of Megacles•
party were not privy.

It is evident then that the Greek "parties"

of this period were factions led by noble families resembling
l

Ath, Pol. 14, 3-4.

9
somewhat the political factions in the southern states of the
United States.

The relationship between the leaders and the group

members is at the least confusing.

These leaders acted on occa-

sions without regard for the wishes of their members.

If a

pa.rt1

is a bod1 of men united for promoting b1 their joint endeavor the
national interest upon some particular principle on which the1 all
agreed, it is very difficult to see on what principles the parties
of Kegacles and Lycourgus and Pisistratus agreed except likes and
dislikes of one another, sometimes superficial and other times
permanent.

One could argue in this case that no particular prin-

ciple serves to bind Senator Edward Kenned1 of Massachusetts and
James Eastland of Mississippi or on the other side Senator J.
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Edmund Brooke of Massachusetts.

Clearl1 principles vary from one member to another within

both parties, and all the members of both parties are united in
their desire to win control of the government.

They all identif1

themselves with the party by having a choice within it.

But then

how much choice did the followers of Megacles have in the dealings
of their leader?
If political parties serve to moderate the differences
among opposing groups, to stabilize political allegiance and to
bring order out of chaos from the multitude of voters, the parties
of Lycourgus, Kegaoles, and Pisistratus did nothing of the sort.
They lacked consistency of behavior because of their personal and
limited character.

Therefore, the consistenc1 in their political

manifestations was the irrational manner with which they persist-

10

ently acted.

The divisions among the Athenians mentioned by both
Aristotle and Herodotus 1 for the period prior to 510 are politicall1 obscure.

Tb.ere were no hard lines drawn among them and the

attitude of their leaders as well as the family descent of the
party leaders illustrate this.

Herodotus himself alludes very

subtly to this in the case of Pisistratus, "in the course of time
there was a feud between the Athenians of the coast under Megaoles, son of Alcmeon, and the Athenians of the plain under Lycourgus, son of Aristolaides.

Pisistratus then, having an eye to

the sovereign power, raised up a third faction.

He collected par-

tisans and pretended to champion the hillmen. 112

The implication

here is that Pisistratus was not necessarily a sincere partisan
of his party.

His leadership of the Hill party was an historical

accident due to the fact that others were already in command of
the other parties.

Herodotus is biased in favor of the Alcmeon-

ids, but his statement cannot be lightly dismissed on this account.
I

think it contains a glimpse of the truth and gives us an inkling

into the workings of Greek politics.

Perhaps the same is true

about the position of the Alcmeonids.

Their leadership of the

:paralioi (part1 of the coaat), whoever they were, was motivated
neither by economic interests nor by ideology.

Herodotus does

not tell us how and why Megacles became leader of the paralioi,
1

Hdt I, 59,3.

2~ifu

79~~

Ash. fol. 13,4.

••• B, 01a01aCov~wv ~wv nap&Awv KaC ~wv

Ex_~ou
t u A{f"tjvaCwvz KaL_~wv ~tv npoEs~w~o' MEya~Ato~
~ou AAxµtwvo,, ~wv 6£ tx ~ou nE6Lou Auxoupyou ~~ou) ApLa~oAat6Ew, ~a~a~po~~OQ~ ~UV ~upqvvC6" ~YELpE ~9L~DV a~&qLv,

bt o~aoLw~a' xa'
µDxava~QL ~oL&6E.

ouAAl'a~

~w

A6yw
•

~wv

DnEpaKpLwv

xpoo~a'
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1 as Pisistratus did, or for a
more lofty purpose, a desire to serve the public.

It too may have

been an historical mutation only because the leadership of the
nobles was preempted or because of a personal antagonism toward
the dominant personalities of the party of the nobles.

Anyway, it

seems from Herodotus' vantage that the interests of the leaders
did not coincide with the interest of the party.
members of the nobility.

The leaders were

They looked upon their followers as the

political instrument that would have enabled them to fulfill their
personal and political desires, whereas the followers hoped for
more concrete political benefits.

Yet there was no unanimity

about the nature of these benefits.
Pisistratus' return signaled the flight of the Alcmeonids 2
who in their exile worked for the overthrow of Pisistratus and acquired the title of misotyrannoi.3

The title was so far inappro-

priate for the collaborators of the tyrant, especially since their
present activities had personal motives rather than concern with
oonst~tutional

orthodoxy.

For the rest, the people were contented

with the mild rule of Pisistratus, 4 and if the people are the
source of all sovereignty and legitimacy, the constitutional legality or not of Pisistratus' rule at this point is of very little
l

Bdt I, 59,3.

2

Bdt I, 64,3.

3Ma.lcolm F. McGregor, "The Pro-Persian Party at Athens
from 510-480 B.c. 11 in Athenian Studies Presented to W. s. Ferguson Harvard Studies in Classical Phi olo
(Cambridge: Harvard
University Preas, 19 0 , Suppl. I, pp. 71-73. Hdt VI, 121,l and
123,1.

4Ath. Pol. 16, 1-2.
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theoretical value.

But even from the practical standpoint the

discussion would be of little value, and the first to have recognized the futility of their opposition were the Alcmeonida.
Pisistratus died a peaceful death in 527. 1
was consecrated in the mind of the people.

His memory

Modern historians,

overzealous as they often are for constitutional niceties, have
also accepted the rule of Pisistratus as a period of positive returns.

Historians chose tu overlook their scruples about consti-

tutionalitiea.
About twenty years after Pisistratus' third rule the
sting was taken out of all opposition and all parties in Athens
usher in the now period of the rule of Pisistratus' sons with a
general reconciliation.

An inscription dated from this time and

found in Athena mentions Hippiaa as Archon in 526/5, Cleisthenes
in 525/4, Miltiades in 524/3. 2 We do not know of any other
Cleisthenes associated with Athenian politics at this time, and
the name itself is not Athenian, hence rare.

Archon Cleisthenes

therefore must be the son of Megaoles, the Alcmeonid from Alopeke,
who later carried on the reforms of the Athenian state (508/7).3

The same course ia true about Miltiades, the Philaid.

Thia, if

true, and I accept it as true, destroys the old assumption that
1

Ath. Pol. 17, l.

2Thuc. I, 20,2 and VI, 54,2. B. D. Meritt, "Greek Inscriptions, an Early Archon List," Hesperia, VIII (1939), 61-62.
3The exact dates are points of dispute. They are shifted
one year down or up. I am not interested in the exact dates here
because they have no important bearing on the views expressed.

13
the Alcmeonids and the other political opponents of the Pisistratids were in exile till the expulsion of Hippias. 1

It points to a

possible advice for reconciliation with the families of his opponenta left by the mild-mannered Pisistratus to his young sons.
This is not uncommon.

People who have achieved their aim in life

"by hook or by crook" become frequently sensitive about their
image, or the lack of it, and they strive later to improve it
desire is natural and not always hypocritical.

The

Many of the eco-

nomic tycoons of earlier days ended their lives as philanthropists.
The Rockefellers, the Carnegies, the Vanderbilts, in the past century are good illustrations of this mentality.

In our own day

Onassis is said to have married into the "jetset" to elevate his
social prestige.
Pisistratus, who had upset the established order, did his
best to legitimize his position once he was in power.

It should

not seem therefore paradoxical if at his deathbed he enjoined his
sons to make a fresh start by reconciling themselves with his
former antagonists.

Hippias was obviously wi1ling to make this

new start because we see him at the outset of his administration
granting the highest office in the city to his family's opponents.
We do not know exactly what transpired in the period between 524 and 514 in Athens, except that the friendship between
the two houses proved to be temporary. 2

We find the Alcmeonids

lll?i.Q..

2The Alcmeonids probably fled the city again after the
murder of Hipparchus, although this is not certain. If so, it
means that they had become estranged again, unless Cleisthenes
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busy against Hippias during the fiasco of Leips7drion, 1 which means
that they were out of Athens again some time between 524-514.

Per-

haps they were expelled because they were involved in the murder
of Hipparchus. 2
When the attempt to dislodge Hippias failed at Leipsydrion,
the resourceful Alcmeonids turned to another source for support,
Delphi.3

They intended to use the Delphic services and the Del-·

phic connections with Sparta to pursue their goal.

In 511 we find

them at Delphi with Sparta as their ally attempting to drive Hippias out. 4 The Spartans were not necessarily motivated by a dislike of the Hippias regime, because theirs was not a democracy
after all.

They were probably moved by a desire to please the

oracle; to ingratiate themselves with the Athenians; to break the
Pisistratid ties with Argos, an immemorial enemy of the Spartans;
to get out of their inactivity and stagnation; harkened to the advice of Cleomenes, their ambitious King who aspired to play a
bigger role in the affairs of Greece.5
support of Cleisthenes.

They finally came to the

This was what Cleisthenes needed.

The

time seems to have been ripe for such an enterprise.
The Greeks were alwa7s a curious people.
have a sa1 in the public affairs of their city.

They loved to
After all this

referred to here is another unknown to us, not from the Alemeonid
family, which is a rather risky hypothesis.
2Meritt, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
1Hdt V, 62,2.

3adt v, 62,2-3.
4Hdt V, 6 6
2- 3; 90-91 •

5Hdt V, 64,2.

Ath. Pol. 19.
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is the sort of relationship that the idea of a city-state
plified by Athens represented.

as

exem-

But the over-preoccupation and

meddling in all the details and in all facets and at every step in
the conduct of public affairs was recognized to be a deleterious
habit by Pisistratus. 1 He tried to channel off their energies
from public affairs to more profitable activities because he desired a free hand in the administration of the city.

Disgusted as

the Athenians were with the antics of the parties, Pisistratus•
policy paid dividends.

But by 510 conditions internally had

changed and so had the political mood of the people.

A new gener-

ation had grown up since the times of Pisistratus.

The elderly
probably did not find sons measuring up to their father. 2 Time

had elevated the personality of Pisistratus in the minds of the
Athenians to heights not easily attainable by the living.

Com-

pared with their father, the sons were found lacking in political
stature.

The younger Athenians, as it always happens with younger

people, were not to be easily satisfied with the status quo which
had imposed upon them the sons of their father.
things as they were.

Nor did they like

The sons were not as tactful as their father.

Aristotle makes Thessalus, the third son of Pisistratus, 3 a headstrong and violent man responsible for the ills of the Piaistratids.

Thucydides makes Hipparchus responsible for them.
1

4 'Which-

ARh• Pol. 16,3.

2Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon tg Socrates (London: Methuen

and Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 84, claims that Hippias was a lesser man
than his father.

4Thuc. VI, 54,2-4 and 56,1-3.
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ever was the case, some ground for complaint existed.

Thia aitua-

tion gave rise to a plot whose motive might have been primarily
personal.

The plot ended in the murder of Hipparchus.

says that the conspirators were few.

1

Thucydides

Aristotle. who had in mind

Thucydides. says that they were many, probably taking into consideration the moral support and approbation that the murderers tacitly received by the underground dissatisfaction that existed. 2
The murder of Hipparchus must have numbed the people's sentiments
for a while, because when Cleisthenes invaded Attica in 513 with
a small force he received no wide popular support.

The murder of Hipparchus however is important for its long
range effects.

It was bound to exacerbate affairs.

logical pressure applied on Hippias was great.

The psycho-

He became suspi-

cious and apprehensive and retorted with more violence. 3

The

exiles among the higher classes must have multiplied, and it was
with the help of these exiles th.at Cleisthenes managed to unseat
l

Thuc. VI, 56,3.

2Atg., Pol. 18,~:

I think that the numbers seen here by
Aristotle have to do with the fact that Harmodius and Aristogeiton
had in his time become martyrs. This is not unlike Lincoln's fate
who was little respected when he lived but sanctified after his
death. The glorification of the tyrannicides has very little
bearing on the political realities of their time.

_

3Thuc. VI, 59,2-3. ~or, o'A_&DvgCoL, ~aA~no~£p,a µEla

~ou~o ~ ~upavvC£ xa~fo~~ xgC b InnLa~ oLa ~o~ov DOD µaAAov
&v ~~V ~~ noAL~WV noAAou, tK~ELVE xaL np6t ~& ~~W ~µa
OLEOKOnE!To, Et n63EV &o,&AELaV ~Lv6 bp~D µETa~oAfi, YEVOµfvDt tndpxouoav ot. 'Inn6KAou yoDv Tou'Aaµ~aKDVOU ~up&v
vou Alav~C6D T~ nfrLoC &uya~fea tau~oD µET~ TaDTa,'APXEoCKDv,'A&~varo, mv Aaµ~a-K~VW ~OWKEV, QLa&nv6µEVOt a~~OUt

µ~ya

ncpQ ~aOLAEL ~apEC~ ouv&o&a~.
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Hipparchus in 510.

The combination therefore of internal pres-

sures and the external aid achieved for Cleisthenes what he aimed
at, the expulsion of his personal opponent.

But it failed to

bring him the political power that he expected.

The nobles did

not explicitly trust his family, and the people had no reason to
support him. 1

After all, he too was an aristocrat assisted by

and vying for aristocratic support. 2
1 The ancient sources agree that the tyrants were not that
bad. The story of the idolization of Harmodius and Aristogeiton
given by Herodotus (V, 66) is a later invention. Even Herodotus
admits that the power of Athena during the administration of the
Pisistratids was great (V, 66). See also Aristotle, Politics,
13lla,15.
2
Hignett, OE• cit., P• 125.

CHAPTER II
THE ARISTOCRAT AS A DEMOCRAT
The Alcmeonids did not immediatel1 attain their goal, the
leadership of Athens. 1 It seems that the Aristocrats, who had
their grudges against the Alomeonid famil7, did not for once go
to the opposite extreme of exchanging Bippias for the mischievous
Alcmeonids. The7 groomed Isagoras for the supreme office. 2 Their
choice was unfortunate for the party but fortunate for the state.
The nobles could have forgotten their grievances against Cleisthenes• family if they really wanted to strike a balance.
the1 were in no mood for compromise.

But

The1 elected Isagoras Archon

in 5o8/7. 3 Be understood the position as leader of a monolithic
faction--but not the subtleties of politics and his position as a
4
state leader.
He proceeded to fulfill the demands of his constituents.

He revised the citizens rolls,5 thus striking directl7

1Robinson, op. cit., pp. 243-254.
2Hdt V, 66,2. Ath. Pol. 20,l and 21,1.
31sagoras was one of the nobles that assisted in the expulsion of Hippias. He quarrelled with Cleisthenes after the expulsion and was elected with the help of the other nobles. The
interval helped Cleisthenes in two wa7s. It provided time for
thought during which his program matured, and it detached him
from the deleterious association of his former allies, the nobles.
Ehrenberg, op. cit., P• 86.

4For the role of the nobles in Athenian politics during
this time see C. A. Robinson, Jr., "Medizing Athenian Aristocrats," n>.t Qlassica~ World, XXXV (1941), 39-48.
5uenry T. Wade-Gery, Essays on Greek History (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1958), p. 152. Author does not necessaril1 accept the
story of new citizens introduced by Cleisthenes. He believes that
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at the former paralioi, supporters of the Alcmeonids in previous
years and along with the poorer classes the bulk of Pisistratian
supporters later. l
Isagoras• measures succeeded in. preparing the ground for
Cleisthenes' rule.

The extremism of his partisans and his measures drove the people in opposition, 2 and Cleisthenes who had
time to observe was the man to profit from the intervening period

of authority enjoyed by the nobles.

Bis motives were personal.

He had spearheaded the expulsion of Hippias from purely antagonistic aims, but he had not developed an inflexible political program.

He had formulated no rigid political philosophy.

He steps

in now to exploit the political disenchantment, by placing himself at the head of the people

(npOO't'ct't'TI~ 't'OU o·~µou

former supporters of Pisistratus.

), the

Isagoras was expelled from of-

£ice the following year, and Cleisthenes took over the government
of the city.

Thus in a haphazard manner Cleisthenes achieved

what the Spartan aid and the support of Delphi were not able to
secure for him.3

The Athenians had stamped the reign of Pisistra-

tus with their seal of approval by expelling Megacles from power
forty years before.

Now they installed into power the son of the

within the Phratry certain "better" families discriminate against
others and Cleisthenes tried to abolish this discrimination by
juxtaposing the demes next to the Phratries.
1

Ath. Pol. 13,5.
cit., PP• 111 112.

-

2

Hdt V, 66,2.

Plutarch, Solon, 29,30.

Hdt V, 69,2.

3Ath. Pol. 19,2 and 5.

Hignett, 2.E.•

Ath, Pol. 20,l.

Hdt V, 62,2 and 3; 63,1 and 2.
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exile.

A full swing of the pendulum had been completed, both for

the Alcmeonid family and the peoplel
Isagoras bears his share of the responsibility for his
fall because, while in power, he pla7ed blindly the game of the
people who elected him.

He could have needled them a little,

that is, he could have tried to broaden the political support by
containing the extremism of the nobles.

Be could have attempted

to revise downward the number of families to be stricken from the
rolls.

We have no indication that he did any of these.

He could

not please all but at least he should have tried to alienate as
few as possible.

The lessons of history should have been very

fresh in his mind.

Hippias' policy after the murder of Hippar-

chus had resulted in the flight of many individuals from Athens.
These joined the ranks of the conspirators and finally proved to
be Hippias' undoing.

It was a potent argument.

A better politi-

cian than Isagoras could have used this argument as a weapon to
caution his followers.

He ignored it, proving once more that

people forget easily the lessons of the past.

Isagoras and his

friends by their foolish behavior in striking seven hundred fa.milies from the rolls of citizens added fuel to the fire that
spread and devoured the~. 1
1

Hdt V, 69,2; 70,1; 72,l and 2. Ath. Pol. 20. For bibliography on this highly debated period of the Cleisthenian Reforms see Hermann Bengston, Griechisgbe Gesghighte ("Handbuch der
Altertumswisaenschaft, 11 4 aufl.; Mtinchen: c. H. Beck, 1969), PP•
128-145 and 151-166. Bengston says that the reforms of Cleisthenes were a necessity. If this is true--and it seems from
their durability to be true--then it is to the credit of Cleisthenes that he finally saw their need, whereas Isagoraa and his
friends refused to recognize the hard facts of their times.
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It is unnecessary to belabor the Cleisthenian reforms.

A

great deal has been written on the subject and every reform attributed to him has been questioned at one time or another.

What is

important to note at this point is that Cleisthenes followed in
the footsteps of Solon.

His legislation was the logical extension

of the legislation of Solon implemented almost a hundred years
earlier; it is also written in the same vein of compromise and
mildness as Solon's.

During the hundred years after the Solonian

Constitution a great deal had occurred that made a general overhaul of that constitution imperative.

Cleisthenes democratized

the regime in the spirit of moderation practiced by Solon.
had given the demos more powers but not all they wanted.

Solon
On the

other hand, he cautioned those in power to respect the rights of
the people. 1 It seems that the claims of each of the parties were
extravagant and impracticable.

If Solon were to seek to please

either one of them, the city would have found itself in a worse
predicament than he had found it. 2 Isagoras failed exactly because he had failed to follow the middle course.
1'

.X,

0

1)-.

His program left

1

.Plutarch, J,eiyes, XVIII, 4.

~~µw y&p iowKa ~6aov Kp&~o,,~Boaov
~Lµij, O~~ &~EA~V, OV~ lnopE~&µEVO'

&napKEr,

ot8 Elxov 6~vaµLv KaL XP~µaoLv ~oav &yD~oC,
KaL ~o!a'l~pao&µnv µDOEV QELKt, ~XELV

!a~DV 6'&µ~L~nAwv Kpa~tpo, a&Ko, aµ~O~EpOLOLV
vLKav 6'oVK Etao' oV6£~tpoL, &oCKw~.

2

Ath, Pol. 12.

- - - Et yap ~3£AOV
S ~or, lvav~CoLoLv ~v6avE

~6~£,
at~L, 6' ~ ~OLOLV ~~~POL,, opaOaL • •
noAA~v !v &vop~v ~6' txDP~3D ndAL,.

•
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no room for compromise.

Cleisthenes, like Solon, a practical man,

devised an instrument on the basis of which some compromise could
be worked out, if onl1 the rival factions showed a trace of good
will.

Therein lay his weapon of success.

It proved therefore

more durable than Solon's and extremely modern.

The unfortunate

interval of Isagoras' archonship proved for Cleisthenes and the
state a blessing in disguise.

It made Cleisthenes more cautious.

It gave him the time to watch and learn from other people's mistakes.
His first and most important step was to break down the
old tribal divisions, and from the ashes of the old to create new
ones. l

He did not do away with the tribes since they were some-

thing that the people were accustomed to for centuries.
made them now serve the needs of the times.

He established new

tribal divisions, not corresponding to the old ones.
was dual:

But he

His purpose

to dilute the hypertrophied loyalty to the old tribes,

and to enfranchise a number of new citizens, mostly resident
aliens. 2 There would have been endless problems in introducing
these new citizens into the old tribes which were organized into
clans and families on the old aristocratic basis.

Now they were

easily included in the new tribes which had no such associations
connected with them.3
1

Hdt V, 69,2. AkQ• P9l. 21,2. Also C. W. J. Eliot,
"Coastal Demes of Attika: A Study of the Policy of Kleisthenes,"
fhotnix, Suppl. V (Toronto: University o! Toronto Press, 1962),
P• 9.
2For bibliography and comments on this subject see Donald
Karn, "The Enfranchisement of Aliens by Cleisthenes," Biet9r~,e.,
XI (1963), 41--46. Aristotle, Politigp, l275b.36.
3:For a brief discussion on·the significance of this re-
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If the reforms did not please everyone, they failed at
least to arouse strong animosities to the point that the opposition would react violently against Cleisthenes.
thus secured.

The four tribes became ten.

Their future was

Membership in the

phratries was, however, retained for social reasons. 1

Cleisthen-

es made the role of the council probuleutic and gave it control
or the Agenda, thereby providing another check against abuses by
the Sft•os.

In so doing he still retained many of the privileges

of the Areopagus, to which he belonged, providing an additional
check against precipitous change.

As a result these measures

eliminated the would be and explainable opposition of the aristocrats.

The aristocrats could still enjoy their social and polit-

ical preeminence within the phratries.
Cleisthenes broke with the old principle that made attendance in the assembly dependent on the ownership of land. 2

It

was a democratic measure fulfilling the demands of the expanding
merchant class so vital to the development of Athens.

Those who

now wanted to venture out in commercial enterprise did not have
to own land.

Finally, the newly enfranchized citizens, descend-

form see Hignett, op. cit., pp. 156-157. The time of this reform
is also questioned. Was the bill passed while Isagoras was still
in power as Aristotle seems to indicate (Ath. Pol. 12,l) or in
the following year? Herodotus who speaks about the tribal division does not say anything on the matter (Hdt v, 69,2).
1Hignett, op. cit., P• 145. Aischines, rr.Ep C 'tfk rr.o:.pa1tpEcr!3c: Co.~ t il?1sl•t P• 147.
2

!!!!!•t P• 134. At least as much could be surmised from
Ath. Pol. 21,6 and from the fact that metics could not own land.

ants or the old met,gs or perhaps metig§ themselves did not necessarily own land.

Prior to Cleisthenes they were excluded !rom

voting in the assembly.

But in actuality the new change was not

so radical as it might appear at !irst hand.

Aristotle says that

the government of a Greek city was usuallyconditioaed by the character of its principal military force, and the main strength if
Athens still lay in its hoplites. 1 The democracy of Cleisthenes
still rested with the body of Athenian hoplites.
lived in the countryside of Attica.

Most of these

Their preponderance in the

assembly was still safeguarded and that made the acceptance of
the Cleisthenian reform easier.

That the legislation of Cleis-

then es found sa tisfactoey acceptance among these hopli tea is to be
inferred by the fact that when later Isagoras tried to remove
Cleisthenes from office with the aid of Cleomenes, Isagoras was
thwarted by the adverse reaction of the people led by the council. 2

Such widespread acceptance had Cleisthenes already found.
Among the laws of Cleisthenes was the law concerning

ostracism.3

Plutarch explains ostracism in these terms,

11

The

1

Aristotle, P9liiios, l32la,5-l4.
2For details on the incident see Hdt V, 70-73. What is
meant by council is not clear. See Hignett, OE• cit., p. 128.
Walker, ~' IV, 140-1. R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, Tpe A<iministrati9n of Jµstipe from Bomer to Arie~ot•e (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1930-,38), I, 131. Ehrenberg, OE· cit., p. 66
believes that the council that resisted Cleomenes was the Areopagus. G. Desanctis, Atthis (2d ed.; Torino, 1952), p. 329.
K. J. Beloch, Griegiji§gpe Geschicht9 (2 aufl.; Berlin: Gruyter,
1927, 12, 399. P. Cloche, "La boule d 1 Athenes," Bgvue des
Etudes Grecque, XXXVII (1924), 1-26.
3There is no unanimity on this as is true of practically
all of Cleisthenes' legislation. Bignet believes that ostracism

25
method of procedures--to give a general outline--was as follows.
is not Cleisthenic in origin. His basis for his argument is that
the Atthidographers do not agree on that. For a discussion of the
sources and the confusion arising from them see Hignett, op. cit.,
pp. 159-173· He agrees that at its best a conclusion must be conjectured. Beloch also thinks that the law must have been a later
invention because, if it existed, it would have been used earlier
than the 480 1 s, a not too safe conclusion. Beloch, op. cit., p.
332. Aristotle who attributes the law to Cleisthenes is very confused on the chronology especially connected with the oath of the
council (Att, f9l. 22). If correct the event would have taken
place in 50 B.c. (Ata, P2•· 22). But that year belongs to another Archon and not to Hermocreon whom he mentions. Secondly, it
is inconsistent with his statement below that the Battle of Marathon occurred eleven years later (Ath, Pol. 22). Francis R. B.
Godolphin (ed.), Greek Histor:f..aps (New York: Random House, 1942),
II, 694, ftn. 31. Marathon took place in 490 therefore the Archonship of Hermocreon should be assigned to 501 B.C. for which
no name occurs in the extant lists of Archons. Donald Kagan, 11 The
Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," HesEeria, XXX (1961), 39l-4ol,
finds it surprising that the originator of ostracism would be
doubted, though he has been mentioned by four ancient authors as
being Cleisthen ·::s ({\th, Pol. 1-4; Aelian, Hist, Var., XIII, 24;
Philocborus, FGrJU,st, ed. Felix Jacoby (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 19501958), fr. 30; Ephorus in Diodorus, XI, 55). He accepts the expression to mean at that time and not that year (the year 488),
He concludes that from Androtion's perspective, who wrote 150
years later~o~E may as well be 20 years. A. E. Raubitschek, in
his 11 The Origin of Ostracism," American Journal of Archaeology,
LV (1951), 221-229, has proposed that the law of ostracism was
passed by Cleisthenes later than his other legislation when Cleisthenes came temporarily out of retirement. C. A, Robinson, Jr.,
"Cleisthenes and Ostracism," AJA, LVI (1952), 23-26, rejects
Raubitsohek's view. Kagan mentions at least two other traditions
attributing ostracism to Hippias and Theseus. The first reference
he finds in Herakleides of Pontos (Fr. 6-? in c. and T. Mfiller
(eds.), Fra en ta Historicorum Graecarum (Paris, 1841--70), II,
208, discusee
y • arcop o, '
a
A
(2d ed.;
Paris: F. Alcan, 1935), pp. 7-10.
See Kagan, "The Origin and
Purposes of Ostracism,"
cit,, p. 398. Ibi,Sl., ftJ'l.. 17.)
"A'AA.or, 6£ E:o'tCv"Immpx.6 ts ::X:a:pµov, w~ <jHjOL AtJKO'Upyo~

ot.

tv

~w Ka:~a AEw~pa~ou~

nEpC 6£ 'tou'tov 'Avopo'tCwv lv

~fi ~Cq>qOLV rni. ovyy£v1j~ µ£v Tiv ll£LOLO'tpa'tO'U 'tOU
'tvpdvvou KaC npra'to~ !~wa'tpa:KCo&n, ~o~ nEpC ~6v 6o~pa:
KLcµov voµo'U 't6't£ npw~ov ~£&£v'to~ OLO: ~tiv Dno~Cav
't~V

nEpC

IlELOLO'tpa~oU

5'tL

y6~ ~'t'UpaVVEUOEV.

(FGrHist, 324,16). Thia view was accepted by Aristotle who followed Androtion (Kagan, "The Origin and Purposes of Ostracism,"
op. cit., p. 395). Also K. J. Dover, 11 Androtion on Ostracism,"
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Each voter took an ostrakon or potsherd, wrote on it the name of
that citizen whom he wished to remove from the city." 1

J. Carco-

pino has proposed an attractive solution to the problem of ostracism.

He sees in it a modification of the severity of earlier

legislation, which prescribed that if anyone tried to make himself tyrant or helped another to do so, "he and his descendant
will be atimoi. 112 "A't°t.µo!; in the sixth century meant that he
could be killed with impunity.3
There might have been talk of eliminating some of the
surviving relatives of Hippias.

Reform is a sleeping monster and

so are people in areas where emotions predominate.

In this cli-

mate people are quick to be aroused and easy to forget, especially when they believe they have a righteous cause to be aroused or
•
a good excuse to forget. Not only did Cleisthenes seem to have
satisfied many of their grievances, but Hippias himself had run
off to the Hellespont where he worked for his return to Athens
with the military aid of the Persian court.

The net result of

this would be either to make Athens a satellite of the Persian
Classical Beyiew, XIII (1963), 256-257. He believes that for many
years the influential men at Athens succeeded, each in his own
actual or imagined interest, in dissuading the assembly from holding an ostracism, so that the first ostracism was the product of
an unsure unity and intensity of purpose.
1 Plutarch, Aristidgs ("Loeb Classical Library"; Cambridge:
Harvard University Preas, 1959), VII, 4.

to note that no one was ever killed
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empire or subordinate Athens completely to Persia. 1

This was

therefore enough to make the Athenians indignant and forgetful of
the former services of the Pisistratids.

In this atmosphere, it

is understandable that a resolution in the ecclesia against the
surviving members of this family might have been proposed, or if
proposed had a good chance of being voted upon.
to suggest here that such a motion was not made.

Yet I would like
Cleisthenes,

once in power, had nothing to gain by such an extremist attitude.
On the contrar1, he stood a lot to lose.

Aristotle says that the

law of ostracism was enacted by Cleiathenes with a specific person in mind, Hipparchus, the son of Charmus, a nephew of Hippiaa. 2
Yet Hipparchus, despite the intentions of Cleisthenes, was not
exiled until 487, almost twenty years after the law on ostracism
was enacted.

If, as Aristotle says, the law was passed to ostra-

cize Hippias, it seems strange that the people would pass Cleisthenes 1 law, but then they would turn around and deny Cleisthenes
the validity of his law by not allowing him to ostracise Bipparchus.

The enactment of the law indicates that Cleisthenes was

still at the height of his popularity.
have

easil~

Had he wished, he could

accomplished his goal to ostracize Hipparchus.

theless, there is another way out.

Never-

The other alternative would be

that between the time the law on ostracism was passed and the apecific proposal for the banishment of Hipparchus was made the popu1

p.

Hdt V, 66,3; 91,l and 2; 94,1-2; 96. McGregor, ot. cit.,
73, ftn. 6, gives details of Hippias' movements during Is

exile.

2

A~h. Pol. 22,4. See also c. w. Fornara, "A Note on
Atheneon Politeia 22," Classical Qu.arterly, XIII (1963), 101-102.
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larity of Cleisthenea had waned, and the proposal had lost steam
while the law of ostracism remained.

This might be denoted by

the following statement of Aristotle1 that the Athenians, with
the usual leniencz of the democracz, 2 allowed all the partisans
of the tyrants who had not joined in their evil deed in the time
of the troubles to remain in the city, a curious statement in itself not because Aristotle himself almost fell victim to this
type of "leniency" but also because it is not congruent with the
realities.

The truth is that the Athenian dS!JloP was not lenient

to its political leaders.3
something else.

The secret must lie therefore in

I propose that the truth lies in Cleisthenes'

other considerations.

I also believe that Cleisthenes might not

have taken the success of his law on ostracism very seriously.
Finally, I suggest that ostracism produced the iron1 of strengthening the tendency toward tyranny rather than lessening its danger.

I will try to be more specific.

Cleistbenes himself a

moderate man and a victim of expulsion along with his family did
not wish to condemn an innocent man to exile.

For that reason,

even though he steered the law through the assembly, re refused
to implement it in the case of Hipparchus.

He left it there as

a Damoclean sword hanging over the head of the would-be-tyrants
--or so at least he might have thought. 4 Thus the old v6µo~ tnC
l

Ath, Pol. 22.

2

A$h•

Pp~.

22,4.

Italics mine.

3This is an axiom that needs no examples. The people discussed in this paper are only a small example of the fate of Greek
political leaders.
4George w. Botsford, 11 The Development of the Athenian Constitution," Cornell Studies of Classical Philolop (New York: Ginn

29
ytvEL (law against the whole family) which resembles the Ancient
Near Eastern custom of the whole family's association in the crime
of one of its members was replaced by a more civilized and humane
law ~D~Cvµa~a ~n' &vopC •• (a bill against a man). 1
There is also another reason why ostracism would not be as
effective a preventive measure as it looked on paper.

The person

who aspired to offset the constitution would certainly act in a
conspiratorial manner.

If his coup succeeded, he would not have

to worry because he was the supreme law of the land.

But if he

failed, he very well knew that his actions would have provoked the
wrath of his fellow-citizens, and his flight was a natural concomitant.

Ostracism was thus superfluous in this occasion.

Outside of the above reason Cleisthenes had a more practical reason why he did not wish to fan the flames of Greek political passions for party or personal grounds.

First, such a move

would not have helped his reform program, which needed time to
and Co., 1893), IV, 204. According to Botsford ostracism was de
vised for the protection of the constitution against the friends
of the tyrants whose leader was Hipparchus, son of Charmus, kinsman of the Pisistratids. Cleisthenes' iDIDlediate object in introducing ostracism was to expel this man because of his dangerous
enmity to the government. He accepts Aristotle's views that the
demos was lenient. The truth is, however, that no open act of
hostility on his part occurred which would warrant the application of the measure. Then the danger of 490 awakened them. Still
no action was taken until two years later, when they learned that
a new invasion was being meditated. To secure their rear they
acted.

1carcopino, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

Hignett, OE· cit., P•
162, does not agree with Carcopino's statement. He simpiy feels
that Hipparchus was not banished because he was not a direct
descendant of Pisistratus. Ehrenberg,
cit., p. 87 says that
ostracism, its rational clarity, moderat on, etc., fits well into
the general picture of Cleisthenes' statesmanship.

of.
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strike roots.
toward Persia.

Secondly, it had to do with Cleisthenes' attitude
This brings us to another problem that has also

stirred the curiosity of historians and for which there is little
information in the ancient sources.
sia at this time.

This is the question of Per-

I have already mentioned that one of the

grudges of some of Hippias' former supporters against him might
have been his collaboration with Persia.

M. F. McGregor, in his article under the title 11 The ProPersian Party at Athens from 510-480," 1 contends first that the
Alcmeontids were hostile to the tyrants, and so they must be
called anti-Persian, especially after the flight of Hippias to
Persia.

The second point is that they were anti-Spartan because

of the policy of Cleomenes toward the Cleisthenian constitution.
Third, the aristocrats who were friends of Isagoras and Sparta
were also anti-Persian after 510 because Sparta herself was antiPersian.

Therefore, he concludes, no strong pro-Persian party

existed at Athens after 510.

When Persia threatened Greece in

490-480 domestic quarrels were put aside by all in favor of a
unified foreign policy. 2

Those who could be pro-Persian were the

commons, former followers of the Pisistratids.

But the commons

had gone over to Cleisthenes and later on to Themistocles who was
l

McGregor,

o~.

cit., pp. 93-96.

For different views see

w_, IV, 168. Also. A. Robinson, Jr., "The Struggle for Power
at Athens in the Early Fifth Century,!!

~,

LX (1939), 232-237·

2 It is an ingenious argument which shows what can be done
even with the meager information that we possess if one has a
good mind. It is an argument needless to say that has not found
general acceptance.
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definitely anti-Persian. 1

He disagrees with the logical point of

2

c.

A. Robinson, Jr. who thinks that some nobles who hated the re-

forms of Cleisthenes could side with Hippias now.

He therefore

does not accept as true the embassy of Athens to Persia as reportby Herodotus.3

ed

Herodotus himself is not very clear on this

point, and his lack of clarity has been correctly interpreted, I
believe, as an effort on his part to conceal the role of Cleisthenes in this affair.

Herodotus reports that after the second

police action of Cleomenes, which resulted in the disgraceful retirement of Cleomenes, and the return of Cleisthenes to Athens
along with the seven hundred families exiled previously by Isagoras, the Athenians dispatched envoys to Sardis to make an alliance with Persia because they were sure that the Spartans would
return.

The ambassadors reached Sardis and delivered the message

to Artaphernes.

Artaphernes demanded earth and water in exchange

for the alliance.

The envoys, after consulting together, anxious

as they were to form an alliance, accepted the terms, but on their

return to Athens, they fell into deep disgrace.

£!!.,

,

~a

~

4

Herodotus does

1 McGregor, op. cit., P• 93.
2Robinson, "The Struggle for Power in Athens • • • ," 2E.:.
PP• 232-233·
3Hdt V, 73.

4
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not spell out what the role of Cleisthenes was in this muddy affair.

He mentions the "Athenians" but does not say under whose

influence and suggestion.

Yet he does not fail to note that the

event happened right after the return of Cleisthenes. 1

At this

point Cleisthenes was a popular hero and it is doubtful that the
Athenians would have acted contrary to his advice.

It was proba-

bly at this suggestion that they sent the embassy.

It is also

probable that the zealous envoys exceeded their instructions and
this brought disgrace on them directly as well as on the originator or the supporter of the proposal indirectly.

After this, we

do not know what happened to the political fortunes of CleisWe hear about him no more. 2

thenes.

I mentioned before that the story of Herodotus has been

doubted.

Yet we know that Herodotus was a partisan of the Ale-

meonid family, and that he would have omitted the story if he had
not found some historicity for it.

Again, if he thought that the

story was a gossip--and the Athenians, like the rest of the Greeks
were very prone to political gossip- he would have said so, as he
did in the ease of the shield after the Battle of Marathon. 3

From

the above, it becomes, I believe, rather evident that Cleisthenes
was in some form or another associated with the proposal to form
an embassy to Persia.

4

What were his motives for supporting such

1

Hdt V, 73,1.
2A. W. Gomme, 11 Athenian Notes,q .A..IPj., LXV (1944), 321339, sees nothing improbable about an embassy sent by Cleisthenes.
3Hdt VI, 115; 121,l; 123-124.

4Walker ~' IV, 157-158, claims that the embassy to Per-

sia described by Herodotus was sent by Cleisthenes who was well
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a proposal?

One reason is already given by Herodotus:

of another Spartaninvasion.

the danger

It stands to reason that Cleomenes

would not let the humiliation he suffered at the hands of the
Athenians pass with impunity.

After all, it seems that the whole

Spartan embroilment in the Athenian affairs at this time was his
project. 1 In such a case Cleisthenes needed support from without.
He could have applied to Persia for aid in order to contain the
Spartan danger.

The extravagant Persian demands and the docility

of the Athenian envoys wrecked Cleisthenes' policy and his political future.

An additional reason for the embassy could have been

the desire of Cleisthenes to anticipate and frustrate the plans
of Hippias and those who, after the Spartan force had retreated,
might have been inclined to machinate with Hippias and Persia in
order to succeed where the Spartans had failed.

If such were the

case we will never know, but again the plan was destroyed for the
same reasons.
loma tic manner.

At this point the Persians acted in the least dipIt was an excellent opportunity for the Imperial

Court to place a wedge in Greece, and to nip the Athenian participation in the Ionian revolt long before the revolt started.

By

demanding such Punic terms, the Persians forfeited a unique chance. 2
aware what the Persian court
it, and that Herodotus tries
envoys.
uNlVERSITY

2Herodotus does not say if the embassy wa disavowed before Cleomenes' efforts toward revenge were thwart
b~~~~
thians and Demaratos, or after. If after, then the drilill'l~l'l'!niCi°e
of the danger might have played an important role in the
change of attitude.

That the Athenians therefore did not dare use the law of
ostracism until their victory at Marathon gave them confidence is,
as Bignett suggests, inconsistent with the above events. 1

Aside

from Cleisthenes' moderation with regard to the use of ostracism
this policy toward Persia might have been a determinant in his
caution.
So far we have accepted with reservations the version of
Aristotle that ostracism was invented by Cleisthenee as a weapon
to

sca~e

the would-be tyrants.

is necessary.

A closer evaluation at this point
It was a curious device as Grote calls it. 2 It

took place once a year, if the assembly so decided.
six thousand was needed.

A quorum of

The man who received the greatest num-

ber of votes was to be exiled for ten years.

At the end of his

ten-year term he could return with full possession of rights. The
exile did not carry with it the confiscation of his property.

No

doubt, Cleisthenes knew the Greeks well enough to know that some
one could very well be tempted to try tyranny again.3
be naive, however,

It would

to believe that someone could be prevented

1Bignett, op. cit., pp. 179-180.
2George Grote, Bisto57 of Greece (New York: Collier and
Son, 1900), IV, 155-161.

3Hignett, OE· cit., p. 186, unlike Aristotle (Politics
l284a,15; 1284b,15; 1302b,15), thinks that ostracism was invented
and used from the start as a party weapon by the anti-Persian
leaders, but the end which they had in view, the salvation of
Athens and of Greece, was patriotic and to that end the banishment of their political rivals was a necessary preliminary. He
attributes the ostracism to Themistocles (Bignett, op.cit., P•
188) who also made the Archons subject to lot and brought about
the election of Strategoi without limitation in years of service.
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from attempting to become a tyrant by the law of ostracism. 1
There is also an irony involved here.
unless voted upon by the ecclesia.

A man could not be exiled

The irony here is that the

ecclesia would exile a would-be "tyrant" at the suggestion or the
political leader who was uppermost in the ecclesia at that particular period of time.

In other words, the people would accept

the proposal of the most influential of its leaders against his
opponent who happened to be the underdog.

The ostracism of

Xanthippus, Megacles, and Aristides, to limit outselves to the
period under discussion, are flagrant examples of the fact that
they were ostracized because the opposition proved itself stronger by managing to mobilize the vote against them.

The occasion

of their ostracism denotes that they had fallen in disfavor;
hence they could not be strong enough to constitute a danger to
Democracy.

The spirit of the law of ostracism did not apply to

them at the time they were ostracized.

Thus, a possible checking

force was eliminated, and the politician who spearheaded the ostracism was left even stronger than he was before his opponent's
banishment.

Who then was the potential tyrant?

There are other

incongruities here also. 2
1 In our times the violation of the constitutional order
is supposed to be severely punishable in Greece; yet there have
been many cases--including the present--in which the violators
were not stopped by the fear of punishment.
2Aristotle, Po••tics, 128l+a,15-19 speaks about ostracism
and its intention by the legislator to equalize power. While he
deplores the fact that ostracism deteriorated to a weapon used
for purely factional purposes and also for the elimination of the
distinguished members of the state C1284b,23), he fails to say
that ostracism produced also the opposite effects, for a vhile at

The Greeks loved politics.
carried it on with all seriousness.

It was their passion, and they
They have managed to survive

in history, despite the passionate way with which they have in-

dulged in the political games, or perhaps because of it.
been a thankless task to engage in Greek politics.

It has

It brings

nothing but bitterness, vituperation, and grief even to the beat
of the political leaders.

The Greeks have been more fanatic and

petty in their passion for politics than any other civilized nation in history with the exception perhaps of the Jews.

Both

peoples have survived in history whereas other great nations of
antiquity have forever perished.
The Greeks rival the Jews in being the most politically minded
race in the world. No matter how forlorn their circumstance
or how grave the peril to their country, they are always divided into many parties, with many leaders who fight among themselves with desperate vigor. It has been well said that wherever there are three Jews it will be found that there are two
Prime Ministers and one leader of the Opposition. The same is
true of this other famous ancient race, whose stormy and endless struggle for life stretches back to the fountain springs
of human thought. No other two races have set such a mark
upon the world• Both have shown a capacity tor survival, in
spite of unending perils and sufferings from external oppressors, matched only by their own ceaseless feuds, quarrels, and
convulsions. ~e passage of several thousand iears sees no
change in their characteristics and no diminution of their
trials or their vitalitz. They have survived in spite of all
that the world could do against them, and all they could do
against themselves, and each of them from angles so different
has left us the inheritance of its genius and wisdom.l
Despite these setbacks most of the Greeks have been little politileast, it left the leader who rallied the people behind the ostracism of his opponent stronger than he was before, and that was not
intended by the originator of ostracism (Aristotle, Politics,
1}02b).
1

Winston s. Churchill, iae Second World War (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), V, 532. Italics mine.
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cians.

In their lifetime they all believe they possess ideas for

the solution of their state's maladies, if only they were given a
chance to enforce them!

They never suspected for once that their

excessive preoccupation with politics and their constant and uncalled-for

~eddling

the maladies. 1

in it might have been responsible for some of

They chose a leader and immediately they proceed-

ed to dictate to that leader what to do and how.

Yet, in spite

of this odd political behavior, there has been no lack of political leaders.

To strike against the political opponent by ostra-

cizing him, as the whole thing deteriorated later, meant perhaps
eliminating one of the opponents, but not the opposition.
each head that was cut off many new ones sprang up. 2

For

The power

vacuum created by the forceful withdrawal of a political personality was filled immediately by others who stepped into the picture.
Besides, the measure itself pushed the opposition to extremes. So
much so that it would stop at nothing until the passion for revenge was satisfied.

The opposition would have no scruples about

engaging in legal or illegal methods against the establishment.
Thus even the constitution itself suffered.

The answer to the

extreme which resulted in the ostracism or Cimon was the assassi ..
nation of Ephialtes.3

1 Ath, Pol. 16,2-3. Pisistratus saw this fanatic preoccupation with politics as injurious and tried to keep the people
busy with other things.
2

The rash of ostracisms in the 480's exemplifies my point.
See my fourth chapter.
3Hignett, op. cit., p. 197.
Siculus, XI, 77,6.

Ath. Pol. 25,4.

Diodorus

For another thing, prosecutors with personal motives could
take advantage of ostracism as well as those who were in reality
public-spirited citizens. 1

As a matter of fact, it does not take

one long to convince himself that he is acting in public spirit,
while in reality he is unable to draw the line between personal
grudges and public justice.

Finally, the Athenian citizens acted

as a court of justice in the occasions of ostracism, and they were
not necessarily the most objective and just judges.

The incident

of Aristides comes to mind here, as quoted in Plutarch, which may
not be a true event but it was true to the character of the Athenian assembly man. 2

Later on we find many authors complaining

about the easiness and the superficiality with which the Athenians
decided on many cases.

The occasion of the ten strategoi after

the naval battle of Argynousae is a glaring example.

Plato jus-

tifiably complains in the Apology that the real issue of Socrates' trial was mostly drowned in a load of irrelevancies, purposely introduced to divert attention and becloud the issues as well
as the mind of the jurors.3

The plaintiff in Apollodorus v.

Stephanus related how on one occasion the jurors were so inflamed
against him by his opponent's speech, that they drove him from
4
the court without listening to him.
The example could be multiplied.5
1Aristophanes, Plutus, 900.
2For details on this incident see Plutarch, Aristides, VII.
3Apologz, 2aa.

4Demosthenes 45,6.

5P1ato, ~' 876B; Gorgias, 515E; Ath. Pol. 27,3.
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The abuses of ostracism would show later in the decade of
the 48o•s, when the old generation would fade away and a new crop
of young, ambitious politicians would fight over the issues of

the day for control of the assembly and the dominance of their
ideas.

For the time being ostracism as a political practice lay

dormant.

This was due to the moderating presence of Cleiethenes,

the wounds of recent troubles, the absorption of the Athenians
with the reforms, the imminence of Cleomenes 1 and above all the
Persian danger.

All these factors contributed to a period of

good feelings during which ostracism was not practiced.
1

Hdt V, 90, 91, 96, 97.

CHAPTER III

DOVES AND HAWKS
Mention of the Persian danger brings us to our next consideration of the period prior to Marathon and the external as
well as internal problems encountered by the city of Athens.

Un-

fortunately, our two main guides on this period, Aristotle and
Herodotus, are very uninformative in this sequence of domestic
events.

Herodotus especially who has expatiated on some of the

ramifications of the Ionian revolt and the attitudes of its leadere provides us with information which we would gladly have exchanged for a more cogent description of the internal state of
Athens, the personalities, and the political configuration therein.

Cleisthenes is not mentioned in connection with the events.

If he still lived at this time, he was probably old and retired
from politics.
Among the propelling forces of the Ionian revolt were the
Milesians Histiaeus and Aristagoras. 1 If we are to believe Herodotus their motives were mainly personal and their role ill1J. A. s. Evans, "Histiaeus and Aristagoras: Notes on the
Ionian Revolt," &!fA, LXXXIV (1963), 113-128. A more recent
article by Mabel Lang discusses the role of Histiaeus and Aristagoras in the revolt. She blames Herodotus tor his malevolence
toward the two leaders. She concludes with the statement that
the revolutionary movement was defeated leas by Persian valor and
the ambition of its leaders than by a failure of steadfastness
and cooperation on the part of the Ionian&. M. Lang, "Herodotus
and the Ionian Revolt," Historia, XVII (1968), 24-,36. Also A.
Blamire, "Herodotus and Histiaeus," £i, IX (1959), 142-154.
Beloch, op. cit., IIl, 5,8. Bengtson, op. cit., PP• 151-161.
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adviaed. 1

Aristagoras tried to solicit Sparta's help first since

the Spartans had already established a reputation of gallantry.
Cleomenes was still the person to reckon with in Sparta. 2 But
the ruling circles in Sparta had a lot to sa7, no doubt, on a
question of such major importance.
Aristagoras came to Sparta one hundred years earlier.
The Spartan turtle was Peloponnese-oriented and it had no intention of moving out of its Peloponnesian shell.

The Spartans had

hesitated to follow the ambitious policy of Cleomenes just a little while before in connection with Athens; would they venture to
adventures across the sea?

Besides, since the7 too must have

held the Persian colossus in awe, would not it be reckless to embark on an enterprise that was bound to activate the Persian
dinosaur against them?

One ma1 call it a provincial policy, but

at least the Spartan polic1 was the residue of a realistic evaluation of the international and internal exigencies of the time.
fhe1 politely said "no than.ks'' and dismissed Aristagoras.
tagoras did not give up.

If he could not get the best, he was

willing to settle for the second best.
shower he went to Athens.

Aris-

After the Spartan cold-

fhere he mixed myths with realities

in order to arouse the Athenians.

He

told them what bad warriors

the Persian soldiers were, how they used "neither shield nor
1

2

Hdt V, 96-126.

Lang, oi• cit., P• 36, doubts that Aristagoras ever
solicited Cleomenesl help.

spear," and "how easy to conquer" they were. 1

Then he reminded

them or their common bonds with the Ionians and that Kiletus was
their colony. 2 There is no doubt that the Athenians had reasons
to be displeased with the Persians.

The Persians had enslaved

the Ionian Greeks; they had extended their sway over the Bellespont, this vital zone for Athens• commercial activities and corn
supplies; they had rejected their earlier efforts at some kind of
mo~us

xixtndi (c. 505); they were lending an ear to Hippias•

machinations, and they had rejected the second Athenian overture
at reconciliation with the imperious and callous demand that they
accept back Bippias, as the prerequisite of any alliance with the
Persians.3

Herodotus does not say it but the Athenians must have

been deeply divided over foreign policy, and the coming of Aristagoras opened up the wounds.

The Athenians abandoned the Ionians

in the middle of the fighting which means that the Athenians
changed their policy toward the Ionians in mid-stream.

One is

led to conclude that their original decision to support the Ionians did not enjoy the unanimous approval of the ecclesia.

4 The

decision to dispatch an expeditionar7 force of twenty ships was
probabl7 the crystallization of an animated discussion in the
assembly and a compromise among the various views.

Aristagoras,

l

Hdt V, 97,1-2.
'En;c::A.-Owv ot. bi C ,;6v oYjµov 6 'Ap 1.0-rayopTJ~ -raD,;Q
!A.EYE 't~ KaC tv i;ij Ln&p'tTJ nc::pC 't~V &ya-O~v
i;~v tv i;~ ~oCn KaC ,;uU noAlµou i;oU nc::pcri.KoU,
~~ O~'t£ aonCoa O~'tE o6pv voµCCovoi. EVnc::-rtc::~
~E XEl.p~-Oijvai. c::tnoav.

2

Hdt V, 97,2.

3iidt

v,

96,1-2.

4Hdt V, 10,3.

as Herodotus sa7s, "at last prevailed and won them over," and
then he adds with a touch of irony the dictum that he had formulated from personal observations during his stay in Athens, that
sometimes it is "easier to deceive a multitude than one man. 111
This statement seems to indicate the struggle

2

in the assembly

and the fact that the decision of democracy, regardless of the
off-shoot of the Persian Wars--something that one could not possibly predict before 490--was precipitous, ill-advised, thoughtless, irrational, and perilous in the context of the international situation in 499.
It is evident that in about 500 there were at least two
trends in Athens:

one urging rapprochement with the Persians;

the other, to put it mildly, was lukewarm to the idea.

The di-

verging trends in the ecclesia are to be seen from what preceded
Aristagoras' arrival.

The question of foreign policy had come

up for discussion in the ecclesia.3

l

The Athenian demos decided

Hdt V, 9?,2.

ITOAAO~~ yap ot~E E!va~ EVnE~tcr~EpOV o~a~aAAE~V

Yi ~va, Et KA£oµtvEa µtv ~6v AaxEoa~µ6vLov
µoUvov out 016, ~£ tytvE~O 6La~&AAELV, ~pEC,
of µupLao&, A&nvaCwv tnoCnoE ~ou~o.

2Walker, Q.Ai, IV, 137-139, 168 contends that there was a
pro-Pisistratean party during the Persians Wars committed to the
to ~.1e return of Hippias and that the Pisistra tids and Alcmeonids
had formed an alliance against aid to Ionia. Robinson disagrees
because he thinks that this would mean the end of the Alcmeonids
since Hippias and the Alcmeonids hated one another. On~ some
nobles could be pro-Persian who hated the reforms of Cleisthenes
and hence now sided with Hippias--"The Struggle for Power at
Athens • • • ," p. 232. Yet it was not unusual for Alcmeonids to
make a yolte face. They had done it before in the case of Pisistratus.
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to iron out its problems with the Persians in peaceful negotiations.
say.

Who the leaders of the proposal were Herodotus does not
Again, as in the ease of the first embassy, he refers gen-

erally to the Athenians.

It would not be risky to suppose that

the leaders who urged negotiations were the Alcmeonids.
not in itself reprehensible.

Thia is

The Persians, however, overconfi-

dent and arrogant made again impossible demands as a result of
which no room for maneuvering was left, and the Alcmeonids who
may have supported the proposal were now embarrassed. 1

The oppo-

sition, no doubt, seized immediately the opportunity to denounce
their foreign policy.

Herodotus, writing ex post facto and when

the events were still fresh in the memory of the people, adheres
to the Alcmeonid position that the idea of an accommodation with
Persia to avoid a confrontation was a valid one before the battle
of Marathon.

After Marathon and Salamis when the Athenians were

basking in their triumph mere mention of such a compromise would
have seemed cowardly and pusillanimous.
the events as an historian should do.

Herodotus here records
He supports the policies

of the Alcmeonids but fails to mention their name because this
would have onl1 added fuel to the fire.

The Alcmeonids were already under the cloud of a treason-charge. 2 The arrival of Aristagoras occurred after the dispatch of the second embassy.
Alcmeonids adhered to their earlier position.
l

They had no wish

Hdt V, 96,2.

2Hdt VI, 123.
nal at Marathon," 1,)e

443-459.

The

Also Barris Gary Hudson, "The Shield Sig-

A;erican Historigal Reyiew, XL, 1936-1937),

to provoke the clumsy oriental giant.

But the opposition had won

its case by default when Artaphernes rebuffed the Athenian embassy.

It is also reasonable to accept that Hipparchus and his fol-

lowers sided with the Alcmeonids for the same reasons.

This

would explain his election to the Archonship in 496 and his later
expulsion.

l

There seems to have been not only in Athens but elsewhere
in Greece a "peace part:

11

which demonstrated its pacifism through

an avowed hatred of war, which did not necessarily exclude patriotism, as Victor Ehrenberg shows, 2 but it did not contribute anything positive to it either.

Pindar and Theognis would be the

most striking representatives of this peaceful movement, and at
the same time a shining example that poets do not necessarily
make good statesmen, and that politics, as Aristotle said, does
not lend itself to poetical and philosophical flights, but is a
very mundane and practical science that requires practical leaders.

Idealogues can be dangerous in politics.3
Going back to the Ionian revolt, one can be sure that the

1 The fact that Hipparchus was exiled in 487 and refused
to take advantage of the amnesty decree shows that he was angry
at the Athenians who dealt him an injustice. Therefore, he was
not willing to go back. He might have enjoyed seeing hie "rascal" compatriots sweat it out, but not the city destroyed. Another type of extremism, stemming from spite.

2Ehrenberg, op. cit., P• 123.
3one is tempted here to draw a parallel with modern peace
movements organized by intellectuals and student organizations
against war, which, however, do not necessarily spell out what
should be done in the face of danger or in the case of sustained
aggression as the occasion might be.
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clash between Greeks and Persians would ha.ve come sooner or later
even without the revolt which served as pretext rather tha.n the
real cause of the Greek-Persian confrontation. 1

The Greeks were

too restless a tribe not to needle the Persians occasionally and
the Great Empire too great to leave the temptation pass unchallenged of an expansion into the Aegean.
Macedonia under their heels. 2
a sling's throw.

Already they bad brought

From there Greece was only within

Herodotus is therefore wrong when he makes the

twenty Athenian ships the beginning of mischief both to the
Greeks and the barbarians.3
tion.

He is right, however, on his evalua-

The Athenians acted without the required bridge-building

in the military as well as the political field which would have
made their action intelligible.

There was no effort on their

part to unite the Ionian Greeks or even the Greeks in Greece to
face up to the consequence of their policy.

The Ionians hardly

deserved any help since they had not put aside petty squabbles in
order to help themselves.

Halicarnassus, for example, Herodotus•

own city, stayed out of the revolt and so did the other Dorian
cities

4 The Athenians did not mobilize themselves and their

potential for any future action.

They only decided to dispatch

1Hdt V, 97,3.

When Herodotus says that Darius inquired
as to who these Athenians were and where they came from (Hdt V,
105,1), he might show the anger of the king but not necessarily
his ignorance. Surely, Darius must have been well apprized of
the Greeks outside his dominion, especially the Spartans and the
Athenians, the two most prominent cities of the Greeks. Hippiaa
and other Greeks were in contact with the Imperial Court, which
could not have been so ignorant as to hear about the Athenians
now for the first time.

2Hdt V, 18,1.

3Hdt V, 93,3.

4Hdt V, 103, 104.
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twenty ships on the spur of the moment, and then in the face of
adversity, after the burning of Sardis and the defeat at Ephesus,
they quickly withdrew them as if they had rued their former decision.1

Their quick withdrawal proved to be as precipitous as

their decision to act was.

What about the fate of their Ionian

"brethren" whom they had incited to revolt with their military
presence'?

Where was their love for "Ionian independence" for

which supposedly they decided to send twenty of their ships?

No

wonder then that the decision of the demo§ seemed so erratic to
Herodotus.
l

Hdt V, 97,3; 102, 2-3; 103.

CHAPTER IV
THE IRREPRESSIBLE GENERATION
With the collapse of the Ionian rebellion Darius had
reached the doorsteps of Greece.
their perilous position.

The Greeks must have realized

Among them, the Athenians had placed

themselves in a very awkward spot by so thoughtlessly drawing
upon their heads the wrath of the king.
exactly was going on in Athens.

We do not know what

Herodotus again fails to inform

us about the various personalities which dominated the political
stage and their policies.

It is not hard to surmise, however,

that the same forces continued to operate on the political scene
as before.

How strong the opposition was we do not know.

The

part1 of "appeasement" capitalized on the Ionian misadventure to
get the upper hand again and so in the year 496 Hipparchus, the
son ot Charmus, a cousin of the Pisistratida, was elected Archon
Eponymus. 1 Was Hipparchus pro-Persian? Was he simply for a
political accommodation with Persia?

Was he elected by the Athe-

nians because he was a relative of Hippias with the tacit understanding to try to reach some sort of a compromise with the Imperial Court?

We do not know.

three years after Marathon.

We only know that he was exiled

The reason for his exile is not given.

1MoGregor, op. cit., p. 85. McGregor believes that the
election of Hipparchus to Archonship in 496 after the Ionian fiasco and before Marathon was an effort to conciliate the Persians.
After 490 the1 expelled Hipparchus to settle the tyrant question
b7 removing all s1111pathizers with the Pisistratide. This they did
b1 putting in active service the law about ostracism forged by
Cleisthenes. See also Ath• Pg.. 22.

~he explanation given by Aristotle1 that the law of ostracism was
passed by Cleisthenes for Hipparchus may give us a clue to the
solution.

Hipparchus was not ostracized when he should have been,
according to Aristotle, because of the laxity of the demos. 2 But
if Hipparchus had escaped unscathed then, he could not have been
ostracized many years later for the same cause, especially if he
had withdrawn from politics and preferred for himself anonymity.
By the 480•s Hipparchus must have been on in years and no one
would have bothered with him.

The fact therefore that he was os-

tracized in 487 must have been due to his politics after the era
of Cleisthenes.3

In the

490's then Hipparchus must have held

l Ath, Pol. 22,1.

3The law of ostracism then had run a full swing of the
pendulum. Enacted against the possibility of tyranny and the
elimination of the strongman, it was actually used as a party
weapon against the opposition and the elimination of the weak,
for certainly Hipparchus in 487 did not at all pose a peril. He
and his policies were completely discredited; so the Athenians
threw him away like old shoes. If one demurs to the fact the
Athenians were justified because the Persian danger had not entirely disappeared, then the Athenians ought to bear part of the
responsibility also because in 496 when they felt they needed him
they freely elected him Archon. Anyway, the fact that Hipparchus
did not avail himself or the amnesty degree in 481 points to the
fact that he must have been displeased with the Athenians and had
no wish to return to the besieged city. No doubt he loved his
city, but he must not have been altogether grieved to see his
"bastard" compatriots "sweat it out." We have no evidence that
he helped the Persians, although he is said to have been condemned to death in absep~a as a traitor, L cour s a ainst Leocrates,
117.uinnapxov yap ~ v XaQµou, o~x ynoµELvav~a ~ v n~ac
npo6oaca, tv ~~ 6f)~w KpCoLv, &A~ tp~µov ~ov dyw a fa ~v~a
&avd~w ~oO~ov CDµLwoav~E,, tnEL6(j ~D' &6LKCa, o6K !Aa~ov
~6 o~µa 5µnpov, ~fiv Etx6va ab~oU l~ &xpon6AEw,,xa&EA6v~E'
xai.. ovyxwvEvoav~E' H.aL noi.fiaav~E' o~f)Aqv, l<iirJq>Louv~o Et,
~av~nv &vayp&~ELV ~ov, ~AL~neCou,.xaf ~od, npo66~a' xaC
ab~6, b~nnapxo' tv ~au~n ~v o~~AV avay~ypan~aL, xaC oC

KAAoL 6t

npo66~aL.
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pro-Persian or rather "appeasement" policies, and he was now elected as Archon because of his political views.

It could be that

Hipparchus as well as Megacles might have spoken out against the
Athenian involvement in the Ionian adventure, and Hipparchus is
now elected Archon with an aim to satisfy the Persian Court.

As.-

suming that this is true, it does not necessarily mean that Hipparchus was disloyal to his country.

The Athenians would not be

the only ones who made overtures to the kings.
cities did the same. 1

Many other Greek

Megacles, the nephew of Cleisthenes, may

have been associated with the appeasement party because be too
was exiled after Marathon one year after the ostracism of Hipparchus. 2

The policies of the party represented by Hipparchus
finally failed.

The Athenians in 493 elected ?hemistocles Archon.3

The election of Themistocles signified the beginning of a more
aggressive policy toward Persia.

It was in the same year that

Phrynichus presented his historical tragedy
(The Captive Miletus).

MLAD~Ou~AAwcrL~

Here Herodotus' account is again blurred.

"The Athenians," he says, "showed themselves afflicted at the
fall of Miletus, in many ways expressing their sympathy, and espel

Hdt VII, 6,1-2.
20dd as it may seem, it is not impossible. The Alcmeonids,
like other t1Pical Greeks, often changed sides. Combining with
Hipparchus now would not have been anything abhorrent to them especially if Cleisthenea had been formerly displeased by the demgp,
something very possible •
.;Gustave Glotz, 'Io~op Ca ~~~ 'BAAQOO~ , trans. Takie
Tsavea
(Athens:
Pii61isSer), 11, 3t). He makes Xan.thippus the Archon of 493 by mistake.
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cially by their treatment of Phrynichus.

For when this poet

brought out upon stage his drama, the Capture of Miletus, the
whole theater burst into tears, and the people sentenced him to
pay a fine of a thousand drachmas for recalling to them their own
misfortunes." 1
ior indeed.

The Athenians exhibit here an inconsistent behav-

They express their sympathies toward the Milesians

in a strange way, by condemning the author of the work.
Herodotus means by the "people," he does not specif,-. 2

What
It would

not be unsafe, however, to assume that the "people" sentenced him
to a fine at the instigation of the "appeasement party, 11 thus
taking advantage of the confused popular sentiments to strike at
the opposition represented by Themistocles.3 Phrynichus was finally acquitted, perhaps with Themistocles' assistance.

The third event of importance during this year was the
return of Miltiades from the Chersonese which was occupied by the
4 He was acPersians in preparation of their Greek expedition.
cused immediatel7 upon his arrival in Athens of tyranny in the
Chersonese and was acquitted.5
1

Hdt VI, 21,2.
2Hdt VI, 21,2. It is interesting to note that Herodotus
often omits names of persons implicated in actions that he mentions. Instead, he makes a vague reference to the Athenians or
the people. It is extremely interesting to see that in the first
and second embassy to Persia as well as here, all three cases in
which the Alcmeonids could have been implicated, Herodotus is not
at all explicit.
3DeSanctis, op. cit., p. 364, believes that Phrynichus
wrote the tragedy at Themistocles' advice.
4Hdt VI, 41,4.
5Hdt VI, 104,2. Unfortunatel7 the accusers of Miltiades
are not named by Herodotus even though he must have known them.
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The accusers of Miltiades could not have been others than
the opponents of Themistocles.

Miltiades was anti-Persian.

His

presence at Athens strengthened the hand of the anti-Persian party
and the appeasement party jumped on his attack.

It cannot be

ruled out, of course, that Themistocles viewed the opportune arrival of Miltiades as a favor of the gods, in which case he helped
him overcome the trial hurdle and later joined hands with him for
a common cauae. 1

Themistocles has already been mentioned so many

times in connection with his anti-Persian policy that a few further comments on the personality of this intriguing man, as well
as the other political leaders, will not be completely out of
place.
Themistocles was §Yi generis a true maverick, restless,
brilliant, imaginative, tormented, farsighted, and supremely practical.

He is the mad genius, without being demented.

makes Themistocles a liomo Noyue in 48o. 2
not.

Themistocles was born about 528.

forty-eight years old.

Herodotus

That he certainly was

In

480 Themistocles was

It is rather unusual from Herodotus' evi-

So Herodotus by omitting what is very important for us in extricating the political complexities of the period has forced us to
indulge in novel-writing which is euphemistically called historical conjecture. Herodotus might not have considered it important, or he could have had an obvious reason. Megacles and
Xanthippus are probably implicated in the attack against Miltiades and Herodotus comfortably ignored giving names. The participation of Megacles in the trial of Miltiades can help
explain not only his treatment at the hands of the Athenians in
486, but also the attitude of Xanthippus in 489 which led to the
condemnation of Miltiades.
1

Bignett, op. cit., p. 181, believes that Themistocles
helped Phrynichus and Miltiades escape conviction.
2Hdt VII, 143,1.

&v~p t~ npwTov~ vEwOTC nap~wv.
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dence then that at forty-eight Themistocles was making his debut
We know that in 493 he was already an Archon epony-

in politics.

mus, the highest civil official in the state. 1

Before this high

honor was bestowed upon him, Themistocles must have been known to
the Athenians.

He

must have spoken in the assembly several times,

and he must have identified himself with certain programs and
In 493 Themistocles was about thirty five years old,

policies.

still a young man.

Even if we did not have Herodotus' or Plu-

tarch'a information the odds would be that Themistocles because
of his youth would be supporting an aggressive foreign policy. 2
Hence he was one of the anti-Persian leaders, and he was elected
to office in 493 because the appeasement policy had failed and
the Athenians were finally led to believe that they had to change
their policies.

Themistocles was then overflowing with energy,

youth, and ambition.

He needed an issue to peg himself on, and

what better issue could he find than anti-Persionism in the name
of patriotism.

The appeasement party already had its leaders.

Themistocles then became the most aggressive leader of the oppositiQn.

He

was a smart and clever man.

Plutarch makes frequent

1R. J. Lenardon, "The Arohonship of Themistocles, 493492,11 Hietoria, V (1956), 401-419, examines the question of the
chronology of Themistocles' Archonship to conclude that Themistocles was Archon in 493/2 but probably held another office in
482/1, perhaps that of strategos. He was a strategos in 480 and
he does not think it impossible that he might have been a strategos in 483 as well.
2
Plutarch, lbe'f'§J;ocles, II,5. 'Ev ~ar~ npwTaL~

TD~ v£6TDTO~ 6pµuL~ ~v~µaAo~ ~v KaC &o~&~µLTo~.

My statement should not be taken to mean that a1.J.. young
people are necessarily liberal or aggressive.

allusions to his cleverness and ambition.
ing1

·1·1 cxvoupyw~
'••

He describes him act-

Plutarch says:

Speedil7, however, as it seems, and while he was stealing all
the ardour of youth, public affairs laid their grasp upon
Themistocles, and his impulse to win reputation got strong
mastery over him. Wherefore, from the very beginning, in his
desire to be first, he boldly encountered the enmit7 of men
who had power and were already first in the city, especially
that of Aristide~, the son of Lysimachus, who was always his
opponent • • • ,
which is natural since Aristides was a cautious man by nature and
had no liking for the wildcat practices and demagogic manners
that stirred up the people's emotions rather than their reason.
I do not know how reliable Plutarch's information always
is, but surely we cannot afford to ignore it either.

Since the

ambition and hastiness of Themistocles is a recurring subject in
Plutarch it should not be dismissed lightly.

Thucydides, who is

a much more cautious man with his statements, does not exclude

the possibility that Themistocles might have been implicated with
Pausanias in some kind of dubious activities or that he was acting in secret with Pausanias to undermine Sparta's influence in
the Peloponnese.3

Aeschylus believes the trick of Themistocles

1

Pl~tar~ht Zhemistg9les, II,l~
,
KaL ~ov~ov YEVOµEVOV OOKEL navovpyw~ ~OU ~WV
v6-0wv KaL yvT)crCwv OLopt.crµ6v &vEA~!v
and though he was .f';-om a poor~f'amily he was ~Tl npoat.pEOEt.
µEyaAonpayµwv Kai noAt.~LKu~.

2

Plutarcht 7.'hamistgqlest III,l.

3~huc. cxxxv. 'Ent.cpoi.~wv 0£ KaC t~ ~AAT)V
nEAon6vvqc.iov. At this point Thucydides draws the amazing contrast in the workings and the mentality of the two systems and
peoples. The Athenians not only had ostracized Themistocles, but
upon the request of the Spartans moved quickly to seize him and
bring him to trial. The Spartans, on the contrary, though a
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just before the battle of Salamis whereby Xerxes was led to believe that he was receiving confidential information and decided
to fight

before the Greeks escaped from the straits. 1

If other

examples of the cleverness and capacit7 of the man are needed one
could easily mention the way he interpreted the mumble-jumble of
the P7thian priestess and made it fit his military scheme. 2 He
went even further in outdoing the cunning priests of Apollo.

He

turned the prophecy to mean that the Persians were really in
trouble rather than the Athenians.3

The Athenians were probably

flabbergasted, but they had no problem being swayed.
Along with this cleverness, Themistocles combined a real
far-sightedness which served his party, his country, and indeed
the whole of Greece well at this superb hour of danger.

First,

totalitarian regime, in spite of the many rumors and information
about the treasonable activities of Pausanias, did not move
against him until they had almost air-tight evidence of his
guilt. Thucydides adds with a touch of irony in his inimical
manner (Thuc. CXXXII):
~no~Ca~ noAAa~ napE!XE, ~avEpov (5µw~)
o~otv Etxov ~~ou ~v n~a~E~aav~E~
~EpaCw~ t~~µwpoUv~o ~vopa y£vou~ ~E ~ou
~ao~A~~ou Bv~a ~ac tv ~~ nap6v~~ ~~µ~v
~xov~cx.

ODµE!ov

1D. Greene and R. Lattimore (eds.), "[Aeschylus•] Persae,n
The Comilete Greek TraJedy (Chicago: Universit;r of Chicago Press,
l9GOJ, I, 355-365. " rom Athenian Ranks a Greek approached
addressing Xerxes thus:
'When the gloom or blackest night
Will fall, the Greeks will not remain, but leap.
To rowing-bench and each by secret course
Will save his life! And he your son, upon
His hearing this, in ignorance of Greek
Guile and the jealousy of gods,
Harangued his captains publicly. '"
1Hdt VII, 143,2.3.
2Hdt VII, 143,2-3.

he persuaded the Athenians to use the money from a mine at Laurion which by happy ooinoidenoe was discovered at this time for
the construction of a fleet of 200 triremes for use against the
Aeginetans,
long time.

1

with whom the Athenians were at loggerheads for a
It seems that the Athenians again saw the force of

his argument and followed his advice, advice which actually proved
salutary for the whole of Greece.
was paramount in his mind.

No doubt, the Persian danger

He also perceived the political power

and prestige that a strong navy would bring to the city, the jobs
and outlets it would create for the multitude of Athenians.

If

the Persians did not come, the Athenians would be left with a
fleet, and Themistocles could further boast that the Persians did
not come because of the fear of the Athenian fleet.

If the Per-

sians did come, the possibility was that the Athenians would make
good use of their navy, and his opponents would be silenced.

In

such a case his far-sightedness would be totally purged and his
opponents discredited.

Finally, the Aeginetan War warranted the

construction of a strong navy, if the Athenians ever hoped to put
an end to this bleeding wound. 2

The correctness of his assess-

ment was proven not only by Salamis but by the Golden Age.
in one stroke he transformed the social structure of Athens.

Thus
He

converted the Athenians, as Plutarch, quoting Plato, says, from

1 Hdt VII, 144.

2Hdt VII, 144. u. Kahrstedt, "Themistokles," ~. zweite
Reihe, Halbband X, Vol. V, sp. 1689 proposes that Themistocles had
the idea of creating a state navy for ·defense purposes.
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"steadfast hoplies" to "sea tossed marines." 1

Hence, again, the

saying quoted by Plutarch that "Themistocles robbed his fellow
citizens of spear and shield, and degraded the people or Athens
to the rowing-pad and the oar. 112

This he did, Plutarch continues,

quoting Stesimbrotus, over the public opposition of Miltiades. 3
This man was the living opposition to Aristides, but like him he
was the product of his times and of the democratized life as it
emerged after Cleisthenes' reforms.

Themistocles like Aristides
4
had neither heroes nor gods as his ancestors.
Nor was he like
Xanthippue allied by marriage to the noblest family in Athens.
He was a self-made man not born into a position of leadership by
descent or wealth.

His father was from a good Athenian family,

but his mother was a Thracian, which put Themistocles at a disadvantage. 5

He was not a "pure-blooded" Athenian and the Athenians

1 H. Bengtson, H!§toria, II (1953-54), 485, maintains that
the idea was not original with Themistocles, that the Thasians
after the siege of Histiaioa, ten years before Themistocles' proposal had done the same thing. For the sea strategy in 480 he
credits Themistocles. Hdt VII. 144. Victor Ehrenberg, The Greek
§ta~e (New York& Norton Library Paperbacks, 1964), p. 85, states
that Themistocles followed the example here of the island of
Thasos earlier.
2Plutarch, ;hemistoc~es, IV, 3.
3At this point the information of Plutarch is confused.
The Archon of 490-489 was Aristides not Miltiades, and in 483
when the proposal for the naV1 was made Miltiades was long dead.
Aristides was exiled by Themistocles and it was probably over
this issue. Plutarch, T~emistogle;, V, 5. Ath. Ppl. 22,7.

4Hdt VI, 35,1.

AtyCvD~ yEyovw~.

Miltiades was 6 &.re Ata:H.OU

'tE KO:L

5Themistocles' mother was a foreigner. Plutarch, :r»,emistocles, I, 1-2. Cleisthenes' grandmother was a foreigner and so
was Cimon•s. Cleisthenes' grandmother, however, was a pan-hellenic

frowned upon "hybrids."

It was enough to create in the boy, who

must have been reminded of his "impurity" by the others many a
time, a strong complex which he tried to overcome later in his
life by his bumptiousness, his sagacity, and opportunism.
The opinions of the ancients are divided about him.

Hero-

dotus cautiously praised him especially for his role at the Battle
of Salamis. 1

Thucydides, in an admirable passage describes the

nature of the man in his inimitable brief manner.
For indeed Themistocles was a man who had most convincingly
demonstrated the strength of his natural capacity, and was
in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that respect. For by native insight, not reinforced by earlier or
later study, he was beyond other men, with the briefest deliberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present and
wise in forecasting what would happen in the most distant future. To sum up all in a word, by force of native sagacity
and because of the brief preparation he required, he proved
himself the ablest of all men instantly to hit upon the right
expedient.2
prize that added to Cleisthenes• descent. Cimon's situation was
different. He had grown up in another environment, whereas Themistocles had grown up in Athens. Georg Busolt, Griechisgte
Qt§chicAtt {Gotha: Heldesheim, G. Olma, 1893-1904), II2, 6 O;
Jean Hatzfeld, jlcibiade: iyudg su; l'histoire Q'Athtiits ! la fin
du ve si!cle (2d ed.; Paris: Presses Universitaire, 1951), p. 2,
fnt. 2.
1

Hdt VIII, 124,1-2.

2

Thuc. I, CXXXVIII,3.

~v y~p 8EµLOTOKAij,, ~E~aL6Ta~a 6~ ~~crew, tcrx~v
6nAwcra, KaC 6La~Ep6VTW' ~L t, av~6 µ&AAOV tTfpou !~LO'
-Oavµaaa~ otxECa yap ~vvtaeL KaC otTE npoµa-Owv t~ aVTDV
µn6tv, o~~ lnLµa-Owv Twv ~E napaxpijµa 6~ lAaxCaTD' ~ouA~'
KpaTLcr~o' yvwµwv KaC Twv µEAA6v~wv tnC nAErcrTov ~ov yEvncroµfvou KpLo~o~ EtKncr~~,--- KaC ~6 a6µnav Etnetv ,daew'
µfv 6uvdµEL, µE~t~D' 6f ~pax~~D~L Kpd~Lcr~o' 6~ ovTo'
a~T00XE6L&CELV ~& 6fov~a tyfvE~o.

59
He combined with this ambition for glory and did not hesitate to
use all kinds of means to achieve his goal.

This does not pre-

vent Thucydides, however, from alluding to his implication in
Pauaanias' schemes. 1

Aeschylus believes the ingenious story of

Themistocles' trick the day before the naval battle of Salamis
and some even suspect that the P§rsag was written to remind the
Athenians what they owed to Themistocles. 2 Others, like Timocreon the Rhodian,3 a contemporary of Themistocles, have no kind
words for him, and I am sure that the Carystiana, the Parians,
and the Adriana would have hated him thoroughly.

4 In the eyes of

Aristides, he must have appeared a slick and unscrupulous opportunist.

Yet Themistocles was capable of lifting himself far

above petty political squabbles during those crucial junctures of

1Thuc. I, CXXXV.
2

ft54 above.

See page

Plutarch~ :rJl.eJiS$ocl~,

XX.I, 2-3·

'AAA'
!~YE liauoavCav ~ Ka~ ~uyE aviLnnov
~ i;uyEa.A~tiS*Coav, £yw o'~p~o~&Coav £na~v£w
Kvop' l&pav ~n ~-Oavav
tA~Erv tva AWO'tOVa tn&r e~µLO'tO~Ati' ~x-OapE Aa~w
4EUO~Ct v' lfo ~ KOV' 1Lpo66i;av' ts, T ~ µoxptov~a e£!vov
f:o V't'
&pyupCo~, OM.UpaA~M.i;o!oL nEL0-0£C, ov KCt'tayEv Et,
n&i;pav'IaAuo6v,
AQ~WV of ~pC' &pyupCou i;dAavi;' ~~a nAEWV Et,
BAE-Opov,
~0'11~ µ£v KO.'tcXYWV &:oCKw,, 't"OV' OE tKOLwx.wv, ~ou,
ot KO: Cvwv.
&pyupCwv tn6nA£w,, ~o&µot 6' tnav66KEVE
yEAoCw, ~uxpa Kpta. napfxwv
ol 6' ~O~LOV K~UXOV'tO µD ~pav 8EµLO'tOKAEu,
y&vfo.Sa~

3Hdt VIII, 112.
4

Plutarch, Themistocles, XXI, 1.
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history in which the future of the state hung in the delicate
balance.

He did that promptly at the council before the Battle

of Salamis. l

He resigned any Athenian claims of leadership to

the Spartans who seemed set on it, provided that they only
listened to his plan.
leave him.

Even now his

11

knavery" did not entirely

He "allows" himself to be bribed by the Euboean and

in turn he bribes Eurybiades and Adeimantus while making a sub

stantial profit. 2

Before leaving Artemisium he contrived a way

whereby he tried to detach the Ionian Greeks from the barbarian
fleet and sow distrust and suspicion among their navy.3

He did

not hesitate to use reason and blandishment to carry his point
through to Eurybiades at the Council of Salamis.

4 After Salamis

he was said to have gone to the islands (Andros, Paros, Carystos,
etc.) and to have pressured the islanders for money like Miltiades ten years earlier. 5

He had the "nerven to suggest to the

perplexed Athenians the abandonment of their city, their homes,
their sanctuaries in order to save themselves, because he be-

1Hdt VIII, 59-60.

2ildt VIII, 3-4.

3Hdt VIII, 23.

4Themistocles headed an expeditionar1 force to the islands
after Salamis (Hdt VIII, 110-112). His purposes were multiple;
first to pay the crews of the fleet (Godolphin, o~. cit., p. 698,
ftn. 13), especially now that Athens was destroye , a form of war
indemnities for guilt by association. Secondly, to ingratiate
himself to the Athenians who had deserted their city at his advice, and now returned to a burned city. Thirdly, he might have
intended to make some profit for himself. Such a devious purpose
was not certainly below his principles. Hdt VIII, 61-62.
5lidt VIII, 112.
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lieved that human beings were more valuable than bricks and
stones. 1

He could have easily moved the emotional Athenians with

a so-called patriotic speech about their hearths and their tem-

plea, but he was too much of a practical man to indulge in such
insipid sentimentalism. 2

His decree for the return of the exiles

just before the Battle of Salamis shows his loftiness and practicality.

This was a time for national unity and dedication against

the common cause, and he who had caused the exile of his opponents
now proposed their recall.

Why should he let those resources idle

or even tempt them to side with the Persians?

This was the man

who was charged with the responsibility of leading the state in
its hour of crisis.
Themistocles' opponent, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus,
from the

~

of Alopeke, was a major contrast in temperament.

Herodotus does not mention his name nor his policies in the preMarathon era, but then Herodotus does not always mention names,
1

The literature on Themistocles' decree is rich.

See

D. A. Hardy and W. K. Pritchett, "Suggested Changes in the Troizen
Inscriptions," Annual of thi British Spho9l of Athens, LDC (1964),

30-31.

L. Moretti, "Studi sul decreto di Themistocle," Rivista
di Filogogia e di Istruzioni Classi9a, XCII (1964), 117-124. ·u.
Berve, "Zur Themistockes Inschrift von Troizen, 11 ~' 1961, p.
,50. Anthony E. Raubitschek, "Die Inschrift als Geschichliches
Denkmark," Gzm:iasium, LXXII (1965), 511-522. For a bibliography
on the subject up to 1962, S. Dow, "Bibliography of the Purported
Themistocles Inscription from Troizin," ~. LV (1962), 105-lo8.
2

Kahrstedt, op. cit., sp. 1689 1692, thinks that the destruction of Athens Sy Xerxes caused his temporary eclipse after
Salamis and the emergence of his opposition, Xanthippus, Aristides, Cimon. If this view is correct, and I have my reservations
about it, we have no evidence to prove it, outside of the fact
that Themistocles did suffer temporary eclipse after 479. Plutarch, Tbemistogles, XXIV, 4.

L
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even though he must have known them, nor does he give a fair pieture of the domestic forces in Athens at this time.

We therefore

have to depend on Plutarch's biographical sketches.

Aristides

was born 520 or a little earlier.
489) he was a strategos.

In the Marathon campaign (490-

In 489 he was elected Archon EponjVJlUS.

l

This means that Aristides was one of the prominent political
leaders in the later 490's.

Aristides admired and emulated above
all other statesmen, Lycourgus the Lacedemonian. 2 He, therefore,
favored the moderate democracy as it had evolved from the reforms
of Cleisthenes and opposed the opportunist Themistocles, especially his political machinations.
All the ancient sources agree that Aristides was the most
upright man of his time.3 He had neither the sharpness of Themistocles nor his far-sightedness, nor his malleableness.

He was a

"square" who believed in the traditional principles and ultimate
goodness of his fellowmen.

He had a lofty conception of his obli-

gations as a public official.

That he established a high repute

of "justness" during his lifetime among a people who loved to find
faults with their leaders is in itself a mem.orial to the man.
Herodotus describing him says, "from that which I have learnt of
his way of life, I am myself well persuaded that he was the best
4
and justest man at Athens."
Timocreon the Rhodian, a contempo1Plutarch, VII, 1-2.

2i>1utarch, VII, 1-2.

3Ath. Pol. 23,
4Hdt VIII, 79.
~6v tyw v£v6µLKa nuv~avoµ£vo~ av~ou ~6v ~p6nov,
!pLC~OV av6pa y£vlo&aL lv ~&~VaL~ Ka( 6LKaL6~a~OV
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rary poet, praises Aristides while degrading Themistocles with
bitterness. 1 Aristides must have violentl7 disliked the political somersaults of Themistocles as reckless and dangerous for the
state.

He was guided b7 his reason and honesty where Themi.stoc-

les acted on his intuition.

Aristides too had ambition.

No one

without a grain of ambition in him makes politics--especiall7
Greek politics--a career.

His ambitions, however, were tempered

and circumscribed by his high character.

Themistocles was out to

win and would let nothing harness his limitless energies.

He

used his energies to achieve the ends without regard to the means.
Aristides would not care to achieve the ends, if the means were
not fair.

As a result, Aristides faded in his death, while The-

mistocles was a m7ster1 even in his death.
Themistocles' nature was "unscrupulous" and "easil1 carried with impetuosity into any and every undertaking.

Aristides

was a firm character, intent on justice, and admitting no falsit1 or vulgarity or deceit, not even in any sport whatsoever. 02
Aristides was the exact opposite in character to Themistocles;
"Themistocles was a reckless agitator."3 Aristides was the opposite. 4 The same course happened on the part of Themistocles who
opposed the measures of Aristides only because they were his, and
Aristides would introduce some of his measures through other men.5
1Plutarch, :r9gietogle§, XXI, 2-3· Charles Fornara, "Some
Aspects of the Career of Pausanias, 11 Historia, XV (1966), 257-271,
examines the poems cited in Plutarch.
2Plutarch, II, 2.
3Plutarch, III, l.

4Plutarch, III, 2.

5Plutarch, III, 2.
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It seems that he had opposed Themistocles' naval policy for two
reasons.

First, because of its effects upon the Athenian societ7.

Aristides was a conservative gentleman who saw with suspicion the
expansion of democracy not because he disliked democracy but because he feared that it would lead to ochlocracy.

Secondly,

Athens had repelled the enemy with its hoplite force, and he probably believed that she could do it again. 1 Themistocles, on the
contrary, emphasized naval armaments because he perceived that
the future of Athens lay in maritime expansion and because this
widened his popular basis.
Their exact position as leaders of the "popular party" is
not clear.

If we have to surmise differences of policy beyond

their personal differences in means, it would not be unfair to
conclude that prior to 490 Aristides was more of a fundamentalist.
He remained truer to the constitution of Cleisthenes whereas Themistocles desired to carry the democratization process started
by Cleisthenes a step or two further.

There is no doubt that the

motives of Themistocles are not entirely non-political, but he
was also in accordance with the demands of the tim.es. 2
About Aristides' foreign policy before Marathon we know
nothing.

The fact that he was elected strategoe in 490 and Archon

in 489 indicates that whatever hie disagreement with Themistocles,
1 That Aristides opposed the Naval Bill is of course a
hypothesis but not an unsafe one. See Beloch, op. cit., p. 142
and Desanctis, op. cit., p. 377. Also Hignett, op. cit., p. 183.
21 believe that he used the extension of democracy as a
whipping issue for the purpose of building up his political basis.

L

he was not opposed to war.

The Athenians would not have elected

to the office of atrategos a man who refused to give his total
commitment to the war cause.

The friction between the two led
eventually to the ostracism of Aristides in 483. 1 It is the only
instance in which we have a clear statement on the reasons for
the series of ostracisms that took place in the post-Marathon

period.

Thus ostracism which was invented earlier as a weapon

against potential tyrants deteriorated from the very beginning to
a means whereby personal rivalries found their base fulfillment.
The story about the boorish and illiterate fellow, who asked Aristides to write Aristides' name on his ostracon, because he was
"tired of hearing him everywhere called 'The Just'" may not be a
true story but it is true to the nature of petty Greek politics
and the Greek character. 2 The expansion of democracy did very
little to alleviate the evils of intolerance from which Greek
politics suffered and as a token of that the leader of the opposition was banished because one of his virtues was his proverbial
honesty, the constant mention of which irritated some of his contemporaries. 3
1Plutarch, Ari§kide§, VII, l 2, mentions that Themistocles
caused Aristides' ostracism but does not go into details as to the
exact causes for it. Ath, E01. 22,7. Hdt VIII, 79,1.
2Hdt VIII, 79. Herodotus also emphasized the integrity of
Aristides. Plutarch, Ari§tidea, VII, 5-6.
3Plutareh, Aristide§, VII, 5-6. I can here mention a similar modern parallel, P. Canellopoulos, the former leader of the
ERE party in Greece. Mr. Canellopoulos has been known in modern
Greek politics as an extremely honest and straightforward political leader. In the elections of 1961 he was elected to parliament
only because or a special law that gave priority in the count of

l
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Aristides returned to Athens in 480 just before the Battle
o! Salamist taking advantage of the amnesty decree promulgated by
the Athenian d§mos at the behest of Themistocles.

Themistocles

was plagued with all kinds of problems and needed all the help he

could get.
events.

Aristides meanwhile was watching the development of

He had noticed that the Athenians could not have with-

stood the Oriental hordes that had descended upon Greece and that
Themistocles' navy offered at least a hope.

He

realized how right

Themistocles was, and how wrong he was to oppose the construction
of a navy.

He was therefore the first to extend hie hand of re-

conciliation, and Themistocles accepted it gladly. 1

From here on

Aristides would support Themistocles' "sensible" proposals, but
he would not hesitate to oppose him in matters of conscience.

In

479, he was elected strategos and commanded the Athenian force
that participated in the Battle of Plataea. 2

He exhorted the

Athenian soldiers at Plataea to fight gallantly that the world
may think that not even Marathon was due to Miltiades alone, or
to fortune, but to all the Athenians.3

Before Plataea, some aris-

votes to leaders of parties and former Prime Ministers. Though he
received fewer votes than another man of the same tickett Mr.
Canellopoulos was elected as the beneficiary of the above law.
Some Greek voters of the opposition pointed with delight to the
fact that Mr. "Honesty" made it onl;r through the back door. The
fact that a mediocre provincial town lawyer did otherwise receive
more votes than a distingy.ished man, they could not see as an affront to the voters' intelligence or their lack of it.
1 Hdt VIII, 79,2.

2Hdt IX, 28,6.

3Plutarch, Aristeidest XVI, 4. Again
clue to the fact that at Miltiades' trial his
tained that Marathon was due to him while his
his contribution asserted that it was owed to
to fortune.

this is a possible
defense had mainopponents deflating
the Athenians and
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tocrats, wished to abolish democracy.

Aristides opposed the abo-

lition or democracy and voted for its expansion. 1

He cooperated

with Themistocles for the construction of a wall against the
wishes of Sparta, 2 but frustrated the maverick yet ingenious pro.
posal of Themistocles to burn the naval station of the confederate Hellenes, so that the Athenians would remain the only lords
of the sea. 3
Aristides was sent out as general along with the youthful
Cimon to persecute the war and expel the Persians from the Aegean
Island (478), and Plutarch notes that he used gentleness and hu
maneness, tact and diplomacy to attract the Greek islanders to
Athena, especially since the Spartan commanders were being boor·ish and offeneive. 4 Be was chiefly responsible for the secession
of the Asiatic and island Greeks from Pausanias.

Be also fixed

the quotas for the members of the Delian League in an equitable
manner. 5

His statesmanship set an excellent precedent for the

Athenian democracy.

If the Athenians as leaders of the League

1

Plutarch, Aristeiae§, XXII,l.
'EnEC ot &vo:xwPDOO:V~O:~ El~ ~6 &a~u ~ov~
'A&T1vo: Cou~, b 'AP i.a~E COTJ~ fwpa: C:rnouv~o:,~ ~'Div 011µ0xpa~ Co:v &noAa~Etv. 'Api.a~EC6D~ yp&~Ei. 4n~Caµa~a
xoi.v~v Elvai. ~~v noAL~ECav xaC ~ou~ ~pxov~o:'
'A~Dvo:Cwv n&v~wv alµna~o:i..

2

ta

Atb• Pol. 23, 4.

3Plutarch, Tb.§;istoQles, XX, 1-2.

4
Ath, Pol. 23,5.

5 11 Aristides, 11 Oxford Classical Dictionar: (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 92. Aristotle attributes to Aristides the
responsibility for the initiation of a form of a democratic Hstate
socialism" for which we cannot be sure however {Aih, Pol. 23,5, P•
90).
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had followed his tactful course, instead of a boorish policy, they
could have adjusted themselves to requirements of the leadership
and its responsibilities in the League, and they could have forestalled its inglorious end.

This is then the man who in the 490's

often opposed Themistocles.

In comparison, Aristides' political

acumen was inferior to that of Themistocles.
decade behind times.

It was also fortunate that Themistocles'

rascality prevailed until 480.
for its salvation.

Aristides was a

Greece owes him an eternal debt

His case proved that in history justness and

honesty are not always virtues.
The third political person active during the time mentioned by name by the ancient sources is Xanthippus.

(The order

in which the four major personalities are described does not neces-

sarily imply their age or date of entrance in the political arena.
Miltiades and Xanthippus were older than Themistocles and Aristides.

They were also engaged in politics earlier.)

of Ariphron.

He was the son

He was a friend of Cleisthenes whose niece he had

Aristotle1 makes him the successor of Cleisthenes in the

married.

leadership of the popular party before Aristides and Themistocles.
We have a strange situation here and the above statement of Aris-

totle does not clarify things; it befuddles them.

Xanthippus may

have been older than the other two, but he was active down to the
470's. 2

Herodotus unfortunately again fails us at this point.

He does not bypass an opportunity to mention his name in relation
with some Athenian accomplishment, but on the question of his
l

Ath. Pol. 28,2.

2

Hdt IX, 114,2; 120,4.

political orientation prior to the 480 1 s and 490'a Herodotus is
mute. 1

Xanthippus was married to Agariste, the daughter. of Hip-

pocrates.

It is interesting to note that from now on the famous

house of the Alcmeonids is going to continue its prominence, not
by its male line but through its female branch.

Herodotus

strongly emphasizes this fact not only by his silence concerning
the Alcmeonid males, but chiefly with the dream of Agariste just
before the birth of Pericles.

Another prominent Alomeonid woman

was Isodike, the woman who kept the erotically frivolous Cimon,
the son of Miltiades, prisoner to her charms till his death. 2
The mother of Alcibiades, that playboy and pest of the Athenians
during the Peloponnesian War was a granddaughter of Cleisthenes,
the reformer.

It is logical to surmise that Xanthippus was a

partisan of Cleisthenes and his reforms.

As a member of the Alc-

meonid family he was an opponent of their rivals, the Philaids.3
In 493 he must have participated in the indictment of Miltiades.
What was therefore his relation to the popular party and the
other two leaders of that party?

What was his attitude toward

the Athenian foreign policy in relation to Persia?

Strange as it

may appear on the surface, Herodotus, the narrator of
dream, does not say.

Agari~te•s

But the strangeness is only superficial.

1

Hdt VI, 131 1 136; VII, 33; VIII, 131; IX, 114, 120.
2
Cimon married Isodike, whose father, Euryptolemos, the
son of Megaclea, was a member of the Alcmeonid clan. Plutarch,
Cipaon, 4-16. See also llignett, op. cit., note J, p. 396 for the
problems connected with the date of their marriage.

3Atbs Pol. 28,2.
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Herodotus who provides valuable tidbits of historical information
elsewhere is deliberately silent here.
surmise.

The reason is not hard to

Xanthippus had followed a dovish policy, like Megacles

his brother-in-law, and had joined him in the indictment of Miltiades which was mainly a personal vendetta and which further discredited the Alcmeonids.

It was probably this muddy affair and

his dovish policy during the Ionian debacle that cost Xanthippus
his party position.

This can explain the general statement of

Aristotle who makes Xanthippus leader of the people before Aristides and Themistocles.

Xanthippus was exonerated afterwards by

his participation in the Battle of Marathon.

But even after the

Battle of Marathon, while Herodotus seems to go out of his way to
mention for us Aristides' ostracism1 as well as Themistocles•, 2
he says absolutely nothing about Xanthippus' or Megacles' ostracism.3
l

Hdt VIII, 79,1-2.

3It is indeed fascinating to see how human beings succumb
easily to nature's frailties. Herodotus• somewhat charming example is simultaneously instructing and amusing. Herodotus gives
us as much information as he can on the various facets of his
story. He demonstrates his mental and emotional predilections
here not by deliberate falsification which would have been reprehenaible--and he knows it--but by discreet silence. He mentions,
tor example, the struggle between Themistocles and Aristides
(VIII, 79). In the same place, he also speaks of Aristides• ostracism. Further down (VIII, 109), while describing Themistocles'
activities, he interpolates an invaluable piece of information
for us but not necessarily indispensable to his story: the ostracism of Themistocles. It is worth noting that he mentions Xanthippus and some of his services on behalf of the city {Hdt VI,
131, 136; VII, 33; VIII, 131; IX, 114, 120). In a masterfully
subtle and simple manner, he draws a picture of the unbribable
character of Xanthippus {IX, 120) thereby lifting him into spheres
far superior in this respect to the vulnerability of Themistocles.
Yet in all references he glosses over in silence the ostracism of
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I have already made reference to the fourth person dominant in Athens between 493-489.

His arrival from the Chersonese

in 493 exacerbated the already tense situation.
born between 554-550.
and Hippias.

Miltiades was

Thus he was the contemporary of Cleisthenes

It seems that he was treated well by Hippias because

between 528-516 he is in Athens.

In

524 he was "electedn Archon. 1

At this time, with the advice of Hippias he went to the Chersonese
to take over the property of his uncle and oik•;tes, Miltiades
Senior. 2

It seems that an adventurer's blood ran in the veins of

the Philaids because both Miltiadeses have been political wizards.
They were the dare-devil types, the dynamic characters the likes
of whom have built empires, conquered frontiers, founded dynasties.
They were of the stuff that Zorba the Greek, Sir Francis Drake,
etc., were made.

If we are to believe Herodotus,3 Miltiades the

younger made himself master of the Chersonese again by ruse.

He

continued to maintain his position with the aid of a mercenary
force and a marriage alliance.

In

514 he had advised the Ionian

leaders to cut the bridges on the Danube and leave Darius strand.4
ed among the wild tribes of the Scythians.
The story is of
Xanthippus. The same, of course, is true about Megacles, the son
of Hippocrates. He brings in his name and his aristocratic lineage as well as his and his family's many services to the state but
not a word of his ostracism, even though it was a common secret
(Hdt VI, 131).
l

Wade-Gery, op. cit., P• 156.

2

Bdt VI, 33-39·

61-62.

4Hdt VI, 103-104.

Also Meritt, op. cit., PP•

3Bdt VI, 39.
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course subject to dispute. 1
Wade-Gery suggests that Miltiades had agreed with the
Scythians to break off the bridges of Darius.

The plan was foiled

only because the ruler of the Lamsakene disagreed. 2
to Darius.

He was loyal

After Hipparchus' murder, Hippias allied with Darius

through his daughter's marriage to the Lamsakene and broke off
with Miltiades.

This does not explain, however, why the Lamsakene

did not betray Miltiades to Darius.

If he did so Miltiades would

not have been able to stay in the Chersoneae longer.

Wells be-

lieves the story that Miltiades left the Chersoneae and returned
there at the time of the Ionian revolt.3

Nepos, who makes Milti-

ades retire to Athens on the return of Darius from Scythia, is

.

simply not reliable.

4

The story is not unlike Miltiades' charac-

ter and Herodotus who is guilty usually for crimes of omission
may be right after all.
In 493 Miltiades is back in Athens.

He had participated

in the Ionian revolt and is forced to flee the Chersonese after

the collapse of the revolt.5
and

His adventures in the Chersonese

his contacts with the Persians had enriched his military

knowledge.

Like Philip of Macedon later he had done his military

apprenticeship abroad, and he was going to use that military

1Wade-Gery, op. cit., pp. 158-159, accepts it as true.
2Hdt VI, 41,3.
3Josep:Q. Wells, Studi,es,4 Herodotus (Oxford: Blackwells,

1923)' p. 118, also accepts the story.
4Nepos, Miltiages, 3.6.
5Hdt VI, 104,l.

..
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knowledge for the salvation of Athens.

But this is a later story.

For the time being he found himself facing a trial because of his
behavior in the Chersonese. 1

At least this was the charge.

The

real motives however were personal.
do not exactly know.

Who were his accusers. We
Herodotus is again silent. 2 If we elabo-

rate on his silence as we have dc.:ne before, we are forced to conelude that Herodotus is silent on purpose.

The purpose of course

is that he is covering up for some people in this messy affair,
and these people naturally are again the Alcmeonids and their
allies.

It is otherwise unthinkable that Herodotus who knows and

says so many things about the Philaids, some of these of doubtful
nature, would have omitted to provide the names in this drama. 3
Besides the Alcmeonids there might have been others.

These would

be the Athenians who had lived or had interests in the Chersonese
and disliked Miltiades' despotic rule.

H. Berve does not doubt

that Miltiades committed foolish acts when he succeeded to the
4
rule of the Chersonese.
Those who advocated a propitiatory policy toward Persia would have a reason to join in the accusation of
Miltiades, even though most of them would be the partisans of the

Alcmeonids and Hipparchus.5

Those who must have accused Miltiades

for his conduct toward them in the Chersonese had an indirect but

1Hdt VI, 104,2.

2Hdt VI, 104,4.

3Hdt IV, 137-138; VI, 34, 39-41, 103, 104, 109, 110, 132,
137, 140.
4H. Berve, "Miltiades: Studien zur Geschichte des Mannes
und Seiner Zeit, 11 Hermep-Einztl§chri!ten {Berlin: Weidmann, 1937),
Heft 2, pp. 40-67.
5Busolt, op. cit., p. 566; Me:er, oi. cit., p. 184; De365; 2.Allt IV, 189; Be och, op. cit., p. 20 •

sanctis, op. cit., p.
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pertinent bearing on the case.

The nature of his rule in the ab-

etract, despotic or not, had really no legal foundation and could
not be adjudicated by an Athenian court.

There was no law that

defined the nature of government abroad, especially when it concerned a non-Athenian territory, like the Chersonese.

But if

legally Miltiades' opponents had no case, in reality they fired a
warning salvo across the bow of the Athenian political ship. This
pertained to Miltiades' despotic tendencies and his identification with a lengthy tyrannical rule.

If democracy is a way of

life, so is tyranny and so far Miltiades' way of life was dictarorial.

A warning was not entirely out of place twenty years

after the tyrannies in Athens.

The court was not convinced and

Miltiades was freed, with the aid perhaps of Themistocles who was
the Archon of that year and whose anti-Persian faction must have
welcomed Miltiades' presence. 1

Be was subsequently elected one
of the strategoi by the Athenians till his death in 489. 2
l

,

l........__

Glotz, OR· cit., P• 30, mistakenly says that Xanthippus
was the Archon of the year.
2Berve thinks that after the Archonship of Themistocles
the oligarchic party of theyvwpLµoL under Miltiades' guidance
became the dominant power in Athens. They turned toward Sparta
for help; hence the future philo-Spartan policy of Cimon and the
cooling off of the relationship between Miltiades and Themistocles who owed loyalty to no one. Berve, op. cit., p. 70. Wells,
oR• cit., p. 112, makes Miltiades leader of the J?!ralioi. Berve
ascribes to the dominance of Miltiades the decision to go out and
fight the Persians at Marathon, instead of staying in the city.
This decision was not, he says, a decision to be taken by the
generals but by the people. Miltiades in his capacity of a leader of the people urged them to go out and fight (Berve, OR· cit.,
p. 77). That the Spartans were the only Greeks, outside of
Plataea, who volunteered to help the Athenians is also attributed
to Miltiades' policy (~., p. 75). Also the proposal to free
the slaves in order to fight and to honor those who would fall in
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The Athenians should have deduced from the proceeding of
the trial one cardinal lesson.

Miltiades was like a stallion

whose effervescent power should be harnessed for the welfare of
his state and his own well being.

They did harness his power dur-

ing the Battle of Marathon, and it produced marvels.

Then,

flushed by the effects of victory, they let him loose and an explosion took place.
This brings us to the next important episode of Athenian
history, soon after the Battle of Marathon, the Parian Expedition.
Even though this affair is not free of dispute, we have more light
because Herodotus broke his silence and discussed it. 1
was the hero of Marathon.

Miltiades

His military astuteness saved Athens

from the Persian danger in 490.

And so "The fame of Miltiades,

which had before been great at Athens, was increased. 112

He told

them that he wanted a fleet of seventy ships with an armed force
and money, without informing them what he intended to do with this
force.

Re only promised them that he intended to make them rich.3

Seventy ships, before the construction of their Armada of two hunthe battle alike with free Athenian citizenship was Miltiades'

idea (~., P•

77).

1Hdt VI, 132, 133, 136. Nepoa, Miltiadeg, 7,8.
2Hdt VI, 132,l •
••• KaC np6~Epov E~6oKLµfwv n;ap6 ~anvaCoLaL,
~6~£ µaAAov a~~a~o.
3Hdt VI, 132.
~E

at~~aa:'

6E vta,

tp6oµ~Kov~a

xaC o~pa~Cnv
a,L ln; ~v tn;L-

KaC XP~µa~a ~3nvaCou,, o~ ~p&aa'
&AA& ~d, a~~od~ Ka~an;AoU~LEtv
fiv o t t1i-;wv~a L--.!A-&riva'ro L 6£ ~ou~o LO L bmp3£v~E!; n;a:ptoooa v.
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dred, was probably all the naval force of Athens.

They delivered

it into the hands of Miltiades. What was the purpose of all this?
Herodotus states that the motives of Miltiades were personal.
There is also another explanation.

1

There are those who agree

with Ephorus that the Parian expedition was an effort on the part
of the Athenians to establish their predominance in the Cyclades.
Nepos, who, according to How,3 follows Ephorua, spells out as the
motives of the expedition a general commission to punish the
islands which had medized and a public policy of establishing
Athenian power in the Cyclades.

The concealment of the object of

the expedition ascribed to Miltiades by Herodotus

4 would there-

fore be the only way of preventing its betrayal to the Persians
and the islanders and might be absolutely essential to the
cess of the enterprise. 5

SUC·-

It is an ingenious argument indeed, but

its correctness is to be doubted on two counts.

The argument an-

ticipates events that happened a decade later.

The Athenians did
6
not have plans of expansion in the Aegean Sea yet. Berve doubts
if the Athenians, who could not defeat the Aeginitans, could hope

1Hdt VI, 135·

A personal vendetta against the Parians.

2FGrBist, II, 59. See also Desanctis, op. cit., p. 366;
Beloch, op. cit., I, 24,2, P• 106; ~. IV, 252-253; Buaolt, 2E.:.
cit., pp. 581-589; W. W. How, "Cornelius Nepos on Marathon and
Paros, 11 Journal 9f Hellenic Studies, XXXIX (1919), 61; Meyer, 2R.:.
2.!i•t p. 197; G. B. Grundy, 1'be ~reat Pers+an War and Its freliminarie§ (London: J. Murray, 1901 , PP• 160-194.

3How, OE· cit., p. 59.

4Hdt VI, 132.

5How, op. cit., p. 59, does not accept this line of
thought.

6Berve, Miltiades, Oi· cit., P• 77.

2
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to subdue the islands.

He does not believe that their navy was

We have therefore to ac-

strong enough for such an undertaking.

cept Herodotus' explanation of the expedition.

Miltiades would

get his personal grudge satisfied while the Athenians lined their
pockets with a few talents.

He thought that this was a fair bar-

gain until the scheme collapsed and Miltiades had to pay with his

money, his honor,

and

his life.

It seems that Miltiades had hoped that a show of force
would accomplish his goal. l

To his chagrin, the Parians decided

to resist and neither Miltiades nor the Athenian navy were prepared logistically and psychologically for a protracted siege.
To make matter worse, Miltiades received a wound and this added
2
to the campaign's ill-luck. Miltiades returned a broken man.
There was much resentment against him.

Xanthippus exploited the

turn of sentiment against Miltiades and called for his punishment. 3

Again I think we should pause here and ponder some of the

ramifications of the whole episode because it could provide us
with valuable insights to the Greek mentality and the nature of
Athenian political "psyche."

The Greeks were an emotional people.

They could love one

and be blind to all his faults, but with an equal force they could

1

Hdt VI, 133·

2

Hdt VI, 135,l.

3Hdt VI, 136tl•
~~DVULOL OE tK napou MLA~LUOEa &noVOO~DOav~a
~oxov tv 0~6µQ0L, ot ~£ ~AAOL xaC µaALO~a 2&v%Lnno~
6 ~pC~povo~, ~~ ~ava~ou onayaywv ~n6 ~6v 6Dµov MLA~La6 €a to Cwli£ ~ij~ 'A-0-qvcdwv &.nch'q~ e:t V£l1.£V.
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hate someone and disregard the commands of reason.
after Marathon Miltiades became their idol.

He asked them to put

at his disposal their entire force, and they did.
ised money, and they asked no questions.

Immediately

They were prom-

The decision of the

Athenians is here of the utmost importance.

There is an essential

constitutional question involved here for which the democracy of
Athens was squarely responsible for the sake of its own welfare.
Miltiades may have acted as a "corsair," but Miltiades was the
type to behave in this pattern. 1

It can be argued that the Athe-

nians by placing their entire force at his command thoughtlessly
placed their constitution also at his mercy.

The example of Pi-

sistratus who only with a bodyguard upset the constitution in 562
should not have been lost to them, if they were really constitutionally minded. 2

I do not doubt that the opposition must have

raised this point now as well as in 493, but the Athenians overlooked it.

From this vantage, then, the attitude of the opposi-

tion could be justified.

Miltiades loved power and was exactly

the sort of stuff out of which tyrants are made.3 Be had made
himself tyrant in the Chersonese and there is no reason that he
should not try it in Athens.

The prosecution had raised that
4
point in the 493 trial against him.
Those who must have objected to the expedition5 must have raised this point.

The Athenians

l Glotz, op. cit., p.

39, says that Miltiades acted here,
as always, like a corsair.
2Ath, Pol, 14, 1. Hdt I, 59,3-4.
4Hdt VI, 104,2.
3Bdt VI, 39,2.
5The ancient sources are not clear on this point, but absolute unanimity is well-nigh impossible. Xanthippus must have
had his reservations before.

•
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refused to heed the lessons of history.
the success of Marathon.

They were overwhelmed by

They were not willing to listen to the

reasonable objection that such an eventuality was possible.
Otherwise, they would not have conceded to him without adequate
guarantees.

Whatever reservations they might have had were over-

powered by the thought of money thrown before them by Miltiades.
Justly, Herodotus concludes with a slight touch of cynicism that
"The Athenians being thus assured, gave him [the shipa]. 111

In

free states the responsibility for decisions taken collectively
is equally universal.

The Athenians were asked to decide upon

the proposal of Miltiades.

The debate was openly conducted in

the ecclesia, and the ecclesia adopted the proposal foregoing the
moot point, the purpose and destination of the expedition.

The

Xan-

responsibility, therefore, is theirs as well as Miltiades'.

thippus, if petty, at least was consistent with himself and his
family's inveterate hatred of the Philaid. 2

The murmurs, com

plaints, the gossip of the Athenian citizens about Miltiades' deceitfulness showed only their irresponsibilit1, irrationality,
and erratic behavior.

Miltiades was made the sacrificial victim

for his own fault as well as the people's superficiality.3

That

some of the rumors about bribe were unfounded can be demonstrated
by the inability of the Spartans to unseat Polycrates of Samos

1

Hdt VI, 132.
~anvatoL

6€

~oG~oLOL lnap&fv~E'

naptboaav.

2Since he was married to one of the Alcmeonid family, he
was part of it.

3CAH, IV, 70.
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which had led to the same accusations of bribery. 1

The Athenians

were so anxious to punish the culprit, their former hero, that
they would not postpone the trial for medical reasons.

Had they

been able to wait for a while, nature would have spared them the
embarrassment--which they did not feel anyway.

Xanthippus, rid-

ing high on the public wave of resentment, asked for the penalty
of death. 2
tredl

So intense were political passions and personal ha-

According to Herodotus, who seems to have no compunctions

about naming the role of the Alcmeonids in this case, the Athenians, who were deceived in their hopes for easy wealth, decided to

puni~h their former idol with a fine of fifty talents.3 Plato
gives us a different version, less flattering to the Athenian
demos.

He says that the Athenians voted to throw Miltiades, the

hero ot Marathon, into the pit, "and had the president [J>qtanis]
not intervened on his behalf, he would have been thrown in it." 4
1 Th.e prosecution may have based its case on certain laws.
"You have an ancient law, one held in great respect, that if any
one deceives the people by false promises, he shall be brought to
trial, and if convicted shall be J>unished with death" ('li;cr·u v Vµt'v
v6µo~ &pxa!o~,

vo~ ~L ~6v

~wv ~aAw~ ooKouv~wv ~XELv,

ofitJ..OV

£~0.1I.t.nDOTj

&v TC~ unoax6µEKpCVELV ••• Demosthenes against

Leptines, 135· Also,"There is a law that !l' anyone dece!ve the
people b1 false promises he shall be brought to trial" v6µwv

5v~wv,

tav

ayy£A.Cav

Recht

und

~Lu ~6v

ElvaL

oijµov

Unoax6µEvo~ t~ana~DOD,

nEpC afnov.

J.

ElaH. Lipsius, Das A'tisc:A1

Reghta Vertahrep (Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1905 , I, 180.

2Hdt VI, 136tl•

3adt VI, 136,3.

4Eta ~6 p&pa~pov iµpaAELV ~4D~Caav~o,

KaC Et
bLa ~6v npd~avLv, l:vfnEcrEv &v.
Plato, Gor,iaa, 516 E. See also Bonner and Smith, op. cit. P• 207;
How, o~. cit., pp. 60-61; G. Busolt und B. Swoboda, 9riecaipche
Staats unde ("Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft," 2 aufl., Zweite
HHlfte; M"tinchen: c. H. Beck, 1926), pp. 888-889, fnt. 6; Berve,
Mil;lrias115t op. cit., pp. 99-101; and Gomme, op. cit., pp. 324~325.
u~

CHAPTER V

THE RASH OF OSTRACISM
Our condottiero was gathered to his forefathers soon after
the trial.

His death was a fitting epitome to his turbulent life.

He had lived by the sword and died from a campaign wound.

!rhe

Athenians made him a scapegoat for his Parian miscalculation and
their own thoughtlessness and disappointment.

The reverberations

of the trial, however, were to echo throughout the decade.

The

Parian fiasco numbed the war party into silence temporarily only.
They had no arguments to defend Miltiades' ignominy.

Only some of

his friends would enumerate hie past achievement on behalf of
Athens. 1 But the political pot was boiling, and the death of Miltiades was going to exacerbate the political enmities that existed
among the Athenians.

!rhis is obvious.

It is to be deduced from

the political events that followed otherwise we,have no data on
Miltiades.

We have no details.

Herodotus again is silent about

such a politically fertile decade.

Two years after the burial of

Miltiades, Hipparchus was exiled from Athens by the law of ostracism enacted earlier.

Why Hipparchus?

We must go back for a

while if we are to understand the circumstances of hie banishment.
Aristotle's evidence is not clear. 2

We can only deduce that

1t

Hipparchus were to be ostracized in the last decade of the sixth
century the act would have been completely illogical and unjust,
on the evidence of Aristotle.

1

Hdt VI, 136,2.

He might have been a relative of
2

Aih, Pol. 22,4.
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Bippias, but Aristotle states categorically that he had not participated in their "evil deeds."

How could Cleisthenes then move for

the expulsion of an innocent man?
other solution to the problem. 1

He did not.

Kagan proposes an-

Hipparchus was an active party

leader in the time of Cleisthenes and the latter passed the law of
ostracism against Hipparchus.
ternative.

Hipparchus, however, was left an al-

He had the opportunity to cooperate with the party of

Cleisthenes and forego ostracism or persist in his opposition and
take the risk of exile.

Thus with the threat of ostracism hanging

constantly over his head Cleisthenes was able to check the political ambitions of Hipparchus and his part1 and to force him into a
coalition based on their mutual opposition to oligarchy. Hipparchus was spared in this manner from ostracism. 2 The argument is
an excellent piece of historical conjecture.

It goes without say-

ing, of course, that there does not exist even the slightest shred
of evidence to support this view.
cept it.

I

I cannot, however, for one ac-

must seek therefore the explanation for Hipparchus'

expulsion elsewhere.

Hipparchus was not, in my estimation, ban-

ished, because Cleistbenes, bis contemporar7, knew fully well that
this would have been a grossly unjust act.
nothing inimical to the Athenian policy. 3
was simply an accident of birth.

Hipparchus had done
His relation to Hippias

Cleisthenes who was a moderate

man and had wished to let sleeping dogs sleep could not arbitrarily submit Hipparchus to such an unfair ordeal.
1

So far the expla-

Kagan, "Origin and Purpose of Ostracism," op. cit., p.

398.
3Ath, Pol. 22,4.

nation of Aristotle is correct. 1

Aristotle's statement that oatra-

ciem was passed with Hipparchus specificall1 in mind is, at its
best, doubtful, and at its worse an ex post facto statement. 2

But

A'c'"" cc.. t/8,

then Hipparchus could not have been dragged out of his mothballs
in 488/7 to satisfy the revengeful feelings of the political factions in Athens for at least two reasons:

first, because the is-

sues of the 48o•s bore little relation to the issues of the 5l0 1 s.
Secondly, because to condemn a political nonentity would have been
no revenge but a "pseudo-revenge."

The Athenian politicians were

out for blood and not for dead carcasses.

If Hipparchus had not

been active in Athenian politics for many years he would have been
politically decolorized.

The Athenians could not have turned

their rage against a political nonentity.

It follows then that

Hipparchus had not been politically inactive.

He was an Archon in

496 representing, as I mentioned above, a "rapprochement" policy.3

During the events of Marathon, Hipparchus was not mentioned anywhere.

This does not constitute an argument against him, but

there is a possibility, a possibility which I accept as true, that
Hipparchus carried his "propitiatory" policies to the point of
non participation.

The story of the shield,

4

true or not, was

circulated only because there were elements in Athens on whom such
an accusation could be ascribed and Hipparchus could have been one
1

VI, I.

Ath. fol. 22,4.

2

Ath. Pol. 22,4.

3see above p. 45; Dionysios Halicarnassus.
Busolt, op. cit., P• 378, fnt. 2.
4
Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,1; 124,2.
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of them.

This is not all.

Hipparchus was also a relative of Hip-

piaa, and Hippiae had accompanied the Persians to Greece.

Be had

conducted them to Marathon, 1 waiting for the fifth-column to join
him. 2 It is only natural that the Athenians• hatred for the traitor Hippias reflected on his relatives, especially the most exposed to the public eye.
party knew it.

Hipparchus was vulnerable and the war

They decided to strike at their opposition, and

Hipparchus was a logical choice.
the law of ostracism.

We do not know who resuscitated

It would not be out of line to hypothesize

that Miltiades' partisans were in agreement with the proposal.
The partisans of Miltiades' party found the opportunity to avenge
his condemnation.

Professor Kagan describes the judicious use of

ostracism as a tribute to Themistocles' political acumen.3

He

considers the choice of Hipparchus as a master stroke that seemed
4
as an act of patriotism.
I have already described the choice
as an excellent one.

That the war party with which Themistocles

was also associated was behind this act admits to doubt.

But

that the rash of ostracisms that took place in this decade were
products of political astuteness is a question of debatable nature.
Ostracism did not eliminate the opposition but a single leader.
Often if misused, and it was misused even in this decade as we
1 Bis father had landed in Marathon where he was joined by
groups who came from the city and marched triumphantly in the
city to become its tyrants.
2Hdt VI, 107.

:;Kagan,

P• 399.

11

The Origin and Purpose of Ostracism," op. cit.,

shall see, it strengthened political intolerance to a degree that
was fateful to the Greeks.

Finally, it deprived the individual of

ten years of his life for no crime whatsoever, but simply because of
his political ideology and his courage to express publicly his
ideas.
The next person to be ostracized is Megacles, a nephew of
Cleisthenes.

The evidence again is meager.

The circumstances,

nonetheless, point to similar causes for his expulsion.
makes him a friend of the tyrants.

Aristotle1

No other information is given

by him as to his politics prior to the exile.

Herodotus describes 2

him as the son of Hippocrates, grandson of Megacles, brother of
Agariste.

This definitely identified him as an Alcmeonid--if any

identification were needed.

Herodotus, however, following his

customary discreet silence on many of the facets of the turbulent
Alcmeonid history does not mention his ostracism or his political
career.

He believed that what the people did not know would not

hurt them, and that if he kept his peace perhaps posterity might
know only the Alcmeonids' contribution. 3

Thia means that Herodo-·

tus did not consider their part during this perilous time something for which History, Herodotus, or the Alcmeonids could feel
justifiable pride in recording it in the diptychs of history.
It seems that Megaclea subscribed to the policy of accom1

Ath, Pol. 22,5-6.

3How true this could prove is evident from the case of
Cleisthenea. We do not know anything about his later years and
his death. If Aristotle did not mention in passing the ostracism
of Megacles, we would have been equally in the dark.
5, ttt;J/ 1,; vA¥\ ~

£)'>111..i I(&<.,'
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modation.

This is the meaning of Aristotle's categorization or

Megacles as the friend of the tyrants.

The Alcmeonids had not

been the friends of the tyrants before, and they had won for that
the designation of misotzrannoi for which they felt proud.

l

Nor

is the classification of Megacles among the friends of the tyrants
entirely fair.
party.

Hegacles might have sided with the appeasement

This, however, does not mean that he was pro-Persion or

for tyranny.

In retrospect, his foreign policy was a failure, but

only in retrospect.

Had Athens been defeated historians might

have argued--if the Greeks as a subject were worth arguing about-that an acco111D1odation with Persia would not have been such a monstrous idea.

The motives of Megacles might have been misguided

therefore, but we have no reason to describe them as treacherous.
Themistocles, Miltiades, and the other anti-Persian leaders proved
to have a better instinct in these matters. 2
This is not though the only mistake of Megacles.

Megacles

became a bitter man and refused to participate in the Battle of
Marathon.

We have no explicit statement of his non-participation,

but the sources that should have mentioned with pride such a patri1

Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,1.
2A similar modern analogue could be drawn in the case of
Vietnam and the opposition to the U.S. policy by many so-called
liberals. One may disagree with them and the correctness of their
attitude, but no one could easily lump them as traitors because
they oppose their government's official policy. In the same manner one should not classify Megacles and those who followed a policy of accommodation as traitors. Misguided they might have been
but not necessarily traitors. The Athenians did not see things in
this light, however, and the persecution of Kegaclee and the others
was a natural result.
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otic contribution are again silent.

Pindar praises the house of
Megacles as the most illustrious in whole Greece. 1 In support of
his eulogy he refers to the role of the Alcmeonids in rebuilding
the Delphic Temple but says nothing about Marathon.
are two explanations.

Why?

There

The first is that Pindar was a pacifist

himself and had no liking for war--any war. 2

The other, and the

most crucial, is that the Alcmeonids' role in Marathon was nothing to boast about.

Pindar was retained by the Alcmeonids to

praise their victories and had to sever his ideas from theirs.

He

would be obliged to mention their part in Marathon as he mentioned
Megacles' Pythian victory, but unfortunately there was no part to
mention. 3

Lastly, their Pythian victory and their connection with

1Pindar, Pzthian Ode, VII; Hdt VI, 121-127.
2Another instance that pacifism, even though it might have
lofty motives, if it is not based on a realistic appraisal of the
situation can be catastrophic.

3c. A. M. Fennell, Pindar Ol;ympian and Ptthian Odes (Cambridge: University Press, 1893), "Pythian t5de,"if. !!he pYthian
in honor of Megacles• victory was written c. 486 only months after
Megacles was ostracized, perhaps because of it. Pindar makes no
mention of his ostracism. Willamowitz makes the interesting com-ment about ostracism in connection with Megacles. He says that
ostracism did not deprive the ostracized person or his family of
their honor or property. On the contrary, it was a mark of personal distinction. In the case of Megacles, it was intended more
against his family than his person. This is probably true. I
will only add here the~ t Megacles was probably the most active
political member of his family and so ostracism was directed
against him. In some way the above statement of Willamowitz
strengthens my suspicion that the Athenians struck at their distinguished members leaving only mediocres and political non-entities. Fortunately they had no dearth of able men. WillamowitzMollendorf, finsiargs (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1922), p.
154.

Along ~ith wrangling over Miltiades' affair and the anti
Persian policy, the reforms of 487 may have a lot to do with the
intense political feeling that ended up with the multiple ostra-
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the medizing Delphians is collateral evidence of their neutrality
during the Marathon campaign.
The Marathon episode glossed over in silence, Herodotus
takes up the mysterious shield episode.
does not deny it.

l

Herodotus oddly enough

He grasps the episode to dispel the rumors in

connection with the Alcmeonids and to deny the theory that they
are friends of the tyrants.

'.rhe statement that follows gives out

more hints than Herodotus intends.

"My (one will say), but they

bore perhaps some grudge against the Athenian communality, and
therefore betrayed their country.

But there were none at Athens

that were of better repute than they." 2

I think that Herodotus

here, by denying it, actually betrays the fact that the Alcmeonids were angry against what they believed to be the ungrateful

ge101, consequently they abstained from the events of the 490's.
Herodotus' arguments against the truth of the charge are not conclusive and have not been accepted by all scholars. 3

I personally

believe that the Alcmeonids were not responsible for the shield
cisms. In such a case, Hipparchus, Megacles and even Xanthippus
might have represented the conservative views.
Ra.ubitschek claims that Xanthippus may have been the leader of the Democratic reforms in 487. Raubitschek, "The Ostracism
of Xanthippus, 11 op. cit., pp. 257-262. The fact that Aristides
opposed the Naval~ill indicates that he was against reform.
l

Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,l; 124,2.

2

Hdt VI, 124,1.

'AAi\.a y&p tow' lxLµEµ,6µEvo~ 'A&nvaCwv ~~ 6~µw
1tpoc:6Coooav 't~V JW't'pC6cx.
µ.~v wv fioav a<pc:wv rfi\.i\.oL
OOYl.LjJ.W'tEPOL iv ye: 'A&q,vaCoLOL lXv6pE~ ooo' ot µ.ai\.i\.ov
l"t"E't Cµ.Ea'to.

ov

3.rennell, op. cit., P• 231.
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and they were simply suspected because of their conduct before the
war and duriagit. 1 True or not the story must have been believed
by many in Athens and served its purpose, namely to discredit the
Alcmeonids.

It must have weighed heavily on the minds of those

who cast their vote for Megacles' banishment.
made an outcast.

And so Megacles was

Another member of the irrepressible generation

that followed Cleisthenes was out of commission.

It is an ironic

conclusion to the career of the nephew of the man who originated
ostracism.

It is also an ironic twist of fate for an institution

'

that was invented for the protection of democracy.

The instrument

devised for the would-be tyrants becomes in the Democracy the organ of the majority for the extirpation of the minority viewsl
We have to proceed.
of ostracism.

The decade suffered from an epidemic

The next victim of ostracism named by Aristotle

was Xanthippus, "who was unconnected with the tyrants. 112 What was
responsible for his ostracism?
not give us a clue.

The statement of Aristotle does

Herodotus again remains silent.

Xanthippus

was not only a member of the Alcmeonid family by marriage but he
was also the father of Pericles, a personal friend of Herodotus.
So Herodotus has an additional reason to be careful.

The fact

that Xanthippus was allied to the Alcmeonid family militates
against him in the 580 1 s.

Be could be accused by extrapolation.

Xanthippus, however, had in his favor the fact that he was in 490

1There is also the possibility that the story of the
shield might have been circulated by Miltiades' party in their
struggle against the opposition.
2

Ath, Pol. 22,7.
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connected with the anti-Persian struggle and probably played a
prominent role in the battle. 1 This enabled him to take the initiative in 489 against Miltiades.

Had he not fought at Marathon,

he would not have dared to raise his head against the popular hero.
The same fact, however, must have exposed him to the hatred of Miltiades• party and generally to the anti-Persian party.

The begin-

ning of his problems which resulted later in his ostracism lies
here.
Xanthippus' political position is not very clear.

Raubit-

schek makes him definitely belong to the democratic party along
with Aristides and Themistocles. 2 An inscription discovered in the
1949's complicates further the case of Xanthippus.

The inscription

reads as follows: xa& v-& ( 1.nnov) (H.a'tcO cpc:o 1. v &:A.c: 1. 't £p6 v npu ('ta)
V£LOV 't'~o'tpa(lf.OV 'AppC} ~povo~ naroa ~a(A.)1.0~'&:61.H.£LV.
Raubitschek suggests thatnpu'tavc:rov
ject ot&:6Llf.£rv

be taken as the "inner" ob-

substituted for the usual1t6A.1.v

satisfy poetic diction.

{or 6Tjµov

He then suggests that Xanthippus may have

been attacked for violating the sanctity of the npu'tav£rov
Sacred Hearth.3

) to

, the

Oscar Broneer claims that by pr1taneon here is

meant Public Kitchen.
long at public expense.

Hence Xanthippus became a parasite who ate
Be notes that there is nothing known

about the operation of public meals in the early fifth century to
1

Hdt VIII, 131,1. Diod. Sic. XI, 27. Also Bignett, 2E.:.,
cit., PP• 177, 180, 182, 183.
2Raubitschek, "The Ostracism of Xanthippus, 11 op. cit., p.
261.

3IJUJi., PP• 257-262.
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which the ostracon belongs.

But at the time of Aristophanes the

abuse had become a public scandal.

Aristophanes (Knights, 280-

281) denounces the Paphlagon, i.e., Cleon, for running to the
prytaneion with an empty belly and coming out with a full stoma.ch.
Broneer says that the spectators knew that the public kitchen was
referred to here.

To dine in the Erytaneion was a coveted reward

for Athenian politicians. Xa.nthippus, who was eating at the "R!.1..taneion is here cursed for his rascality. For a long time he had
abused Athenian hospitality. 1 In reference to Raubitschek'a
Sacred Hearth, Broneer sees no such profanation recorded elsewhere.
He surmises therefore that no such meaning was intended by the potsherd.
Eugene Schweigert does not agree with Broneer.

He thinks

that the text of the inscription is an elegiac couplet.

Its style

is too lofty for oatraca where in general the writers were illiterate.

The crux of the problem lies in the word nptnave::!ov •

He

believes that it should actually be the genitive plural of this
\tlord.

Xanthippus becomes "a curse of the leaders," a. common poetic

usage, he says.

The ostracon therefore asserts that Xantbippus,

the son of Arriphron, has become especially harmful as a curse of
the leaders.

The leader that comes to mind is Miltiades.

We may

then suppose, according to Schweigert, that the writer of the ostracon was a partisan of Miltiades who was now voting for the
10. Broneer, "Notes on the Xa.nthippos Ostracon," W,, LII
(1948), 341. See Kni~hts, 445-446; Lysias, A~ainet Andocides for
Impiety, VI, 52-53; Aischines~ Against Ktesi~ on, ii!; nemosthenes,
QA the Crowp, 159. aAEl.'tEpOr; more common X1'h11P 1.0~ •

92
expulsion of Xanthippus for his role in the trial of Miltiades. 1
The last person mentioned by Aristotle as exiled prior to
Salamis was Aristides.

In the interval between the banishment of

Xanthippus and the ostracism of Aristides an important event occurred which was going to contribute to the salvation of Athens
and of all Greece, though the Athenians did not realize it and the
other Greeks were not even aware of it.

This is the discovery of

the mines of Maroneia from where the city made a tremendous profit. 2 Athenians looking for quick riches even since the time of
the Parian expedition, recommended the distribution of money.
was an unorthodox proposal.
he blocked it.

It

Themistocles had different ideas, and

He counter-proposed that the money be entrusted to

the hundred richest men in Athens, one talent each, and if the
manner in which the money was spent pleased the people "the investment of the money on behalf of the city was well done; if the
people failed to agree with the way the money was invested, then
they would return the money to the creditors. 11 3

Regardless of the

results that the proposal produced, the proposal itself is a curioua one.

How did the leader of the popular party convince the

people to go along with this puzzling suggestion, Aristotle does
1i:ugene Schweigert, 11 Xanthippos Ostracon," AJA, LIII
(1949), 266-267. This is congruent with my assertion that the
partisans of Miltiades were chiefly responsible for the first
ostracisms mentioned by Aristotle. Their motives were primarily
personal, the revenge of Miltiades• condemnation engineered by the
Alcmeonids.
2Ath. Pol. 22,7; Hdt VII, 144,1; Thuc. I, 14.

~a

3Ath. Pgl. XXII, 7. Translation mine.
~D~ n~AEW~ EtvaL ~~v oa~&v~v, EL OE
XPDµa~a nap& ~wv oavELoaµtvwv.

µ~ ~oµCoaa~aL

9.3
not indicate.

1

What the relations were between the leader of the

people's party and the great "capitalists," who, one might expect,
did not belong to his party ia a mystery that only a devilish person like Themistocles could answer. 2 Why did the money men of
Athens consent to the scheme, and what profit they believed they
would derive beyond the promotion of the state's welfare is to us
an enigma.

The people adopted Themistocles' advice and a coali-

tion between the people's party and the wealthy Athenians was
formed.

It shows again that the lines among parties were never

rigidly delimited in the Athenian state.
The proposal itself, to say the least, was constitutionally highly ambivalent.

But then the Athenian voters were "open-

mindedtt people and never argued over "petty" constitutional points.
The case of Miltiades earlier who refused to divulge the purpose
of his expedition was not dissimilar to Themistocles' case now,
who refused to state the purpose for the distribution of money
among the Athenian rich men.3 Yet the people espoused the proposal.

So quickly history's lessons are forgotten1

The world goes

blundering onl
Themistocles' refusal to explain his plane was due, partl1

1 Ath, Pol. 22,7.
2

Ath. Pol. 22,7.

KEAEvwv

~or~ nAouaLw~a~oL'

laDvaLoL, 6avECaaaL.

3Ath. Pol. 22,7. I think that Themistocles was trying to
accomplish two things here. First to ingratiate himself to his
natural political enemies by placing his trust in them for the
success of his plan, and secondly to convince the people to go
along with the plan.

at least, to the well-known fact that Aristides would object to
the construction of the navy. 1

No doubt, Aristides must have ob-

jected not only to the Navy Bill, but also to the invidious proposal.

From hindsight, Themistocles' insight has been justified,

and the world is thankful to him.
sight.

But this is only from hind-

The proposal may have been comparable to the genius of the

man who initiated it.

But looked upon from the standpoint of the

pre-Salamis period, Aristides was not entirely wrong.

It does not

Themistocles had hie way, and Aristides was ostracized. 2

matter.

Later, he may have been the first to admit that he was wrong opposing the Naval Bill.
Now that the fourth person mentioned by Aristotle has been
ostracized, I think it behooves us to stop briefly and contemplate
what ostracism meant.

Hignett believes that the law of ostracism

was rightly invoked against Aristides after his ill-timed opposi-tion to the proposal on which the salvation of Athens in the impending war was dependent.3

It is indeed self-evident that the

salvation of Greece was achieved mainly by the Athenian ships.
Th.is certain knowledge is, however, from hindsight.

I am concerned

with the rightness of Aristides' ostracism or not, and the wisdom
of ostracism in the 480•s.

From the ver1 same fact that Th.emis-

tocles was able to navigate Aristides' ostracism through the Assembl7, I am inclined to think that he could have passed his Naval
l

Ath. PpJ:. 22,8.

2

Ath, Pgl. 22,7,

3Kagan, "Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," op. cit., P•

397; Hignett, op. cit., p. 189.
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Bill despite Aristides' objections.

If so, then

why'

ostracize a

man who by character would have abided by the people's decision
anyway?

One could say at this point that in ostracizing Aristi-

des Themistocles managed to muzzle the opposition with one blow. 1
I must be permitted to have my doubts on this.
easily shaken from their obstinancy.

Greeks are not so

On the other hand, ostra-

cism deprived the state of the services of able men if we are to
judge from Aristides' and Xanthippus• post-Salamis performances.
What is more important, is the fact that the clause on ostracism
as interpreted in the 48o•s was a flagrant misinterpretation of
constitutional theory.

Ostracism was not meant to be by its

founder a weapon against democracy but an organ for its protection.

It was not designed to serve as an instrument against free

expression by the opposition, but a shield from the would-be tyrants.

We do not have information on Cleisthenes' view, but he

might have thought that variety of opinion did no harm to democracy and this is the reason why he did not emplo7 it as a weapon
against his opponents.

Ostracism, at its worst, increased intol-

erance; at its best, it is to be doubted for its effectiveness.
1

Kagan, "Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," o;p. cit.,
PP• 400-4ol.

CHAPTER VI
THE BANDWAGON

While an ostracophoria was directed against one person or
was a contest between two or more, in practice there was no obligation on the part of the voter to cast his ballot against any
one of them.

He was free to write the name of anyone whom he

wished to see banished.

The major candidates of ostracism in the

48o•s are known to us from history, mainly from Aristotle's
naion Politeia.

~-

Besides these historical references, a great num-

ber of ostraca dug up since the 1930's have shed ample light to
the institution of ostracism.

One is virtually faced with a swarm

of ostraca that bear names not otherwise known to us from history
against whom perhaps only a few votes were cast.

The tact that

votes were cast against them is in itself evidence that the persons concerned with political men of some prominence in their day. 1
This further proves, if any further proof were needed, that the
misapplication of the institution by the erratic Greeks tended to
punish prominence and permitted the reign of the mediocre.

A

great many (524) ostraca were discovered in 1947, nearly as many
as in all previous archaeological expeditions.

All of them were

found in the same general area, the deep valley between the Areopagus and the Hill of Nymphs.

Most of the pieces came from a

single large group consisting of 491 ostraca, the largest ever dis1Eugene Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian
Agora," Hesperia, VIII (Supplement, 1949), 394.
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covered.

The deposit from which they came was one meter by one

and a half meters deep and six to eight meters across.

It divided

to three layers, all of them judged to be contemporary for ostraca
with the same name appear in all three of them and there are instances in which fragments of the same ostracon were found in different layers.

The known names of the ostraca are all persons

active in the early part of the fifth century. 1

Among the new

ostraca there were three "unique" and tantalizing pieces which
bear the names apparently connected with the great Alcmeonid family.

One of them reads KAa:A. 1.ca:vo~

MEO't'EVO~

which could be

Kallixenos, son of Cleisthenes, probably an otherwise unknown son
of Cleisthenes, the legislator.

Another reads

'Ap1.a't'ovuµo

KaA.-

perhaps a close relative of Kallixenos, son of Aristonymos, whose name appears frequently on ostraca of the late
48o•s of the fifth century. 2

A third reads KA.1.0-&tvc:~ ~p1..avu(µo)

and ma7 be interpreted either as Cleiathenes or Kallisthenes, son
of Aristonymos.3

In a pile of ostraca the name Acha.rnion Xypetaion appears

'Axa:pvCov

(Xov~a't'a1.o)vov

, a person not otherwise known.

name is unusual, hitherto reported only once.

4

He

His

was evidently

active in politics in the 480's of the fifth centur7, and two ostraca bear his name.5

The ostraca were found on March 28, 1935,

1H. A. Thompson, "Excavations of the Athenian Agora,"
Hesperia, XVII (1948), 193-194.
2

!111a.,

P•

193·

3lli.!i.

5vanderpool, op. cit., p. 394.

4I.G. II 2 , 7098.

in Section B in the fill of the Porua Building South of the Tha1os.

l

The pottery from this fill was mostl1 of the early fifth

centur1, though there were also fragments as late as about 420.
The fill was probably a

11

Perserschutt 11 that was dug up in the

last quarter of the fifth century and re-used as fill in the
Porus building.
early. 2

It contained 56 ostraca, all but one of them

These have the names of Themistocles (15), Kallixenos

(7), Hipparchos (6), Aristeides (6), Xanthippos (5), Boutalion
(3), Megacles (2), Hippocrates Alkmeonidon (2), Hippocrates
Anaxileo (2), Habron Hierocl(es), Kydrocles, Eratyllos, Dion1sios
and Acharnion, one each.3
On June 12, 1939, in a deposit of sand in shallow channel
in bedrock at the ver1 bottom of the Great Drain which follows the
bottom of the valley between the Areopagus and Kolonus Agoraius

a deposit of ostraca was found containing the following names:
Andronicko(s) (1).

This person is not identified, although the

name is not uncommon.

There is no instances of it known from the

fifth century. 4 The circumstances however of finding this single
ostracon with the name shows that the man was active in politics
in the 480 1 s of the fifth century.

The other names that appear on

ostraca are Themistocles (69), Kallixenus (45), Hippocrates Alk-

1H. A. Thompson, HesReria, Supplement IV (1940), p. 44.
2

Vanderpool, op. cit., PP• 394-395.

3Among them one ostracon of the later fifth century with
the name of Charias of Paianieus which may well have been cast in
the ostracophoria of 417 was found in a disturbed part of this
fill.
4
lRi4•t P• 395.
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meonidon Alopekethen (44), Aristides (2), Kydrocles (2), llabron

(1), Eratyllus (1),a son of Hippocrates (1), and uncertain (6). 1
Found on February 21, 1938 in Section Z imbedded in the
foundation of the North Wall of the Archaic building north of the
Tholos was the fragment of an ostracon from the wall of a large

The inscription is

closed pot with thin red glaze on the outside.
scratched on the inside Al)EXE\IO~
known.

r;i? LA.ocroc:vo

(v) not otherwise

We only gather that he must have been active in politics

in the 480 1 s of the fifth century as the circumstances of the discovery finding the sherd bearing his name indioate. 2

Another

sherd was found near the road leading to the southwest corner of
the Agora on June 11, 1935, in a mixed fill.
produced many early fifth century ostraca.

The area of the fill
The letter forms sug-

gest early fifth century but the names cannot be restored with
certainty (Arist----- Charop

).3 An inscription bearing the

name Arista (ichmos?) Timo {Kratous) is suspected to refer to the
4 Two ostraca have been found
brother of Kydrokes mentioned above.
for a certain Dionysius --- onou, who cannot be further identified.
His own name is clear but that of his father's is doubtful.5

The

archaeological circumstances of finding the ostraca indicate again
the 48o•s of the fifth century. 6 Eight other ostraca found in the
2

~., PP•

395-396.

3

~.,

P•

396.

4
See p. 98, above.
5vanderpool (op. cit., pp. 396-397) suggests it could be
Antigonos.
6

~.,

P• 397.
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same deposit bear t4e names of Themistocles, Kallixenus, Hippocrates

Kydrocles and possibly Megacles.

Alkmeonido~,

In a pile near

the New Bouleuterion {Section B), on April 17, 1934, were found
three ostraca the circumstances of which again indicate a date in
the 480's of the fifth century.
tyllus Kattariou.

The name on the ostraca is Era-

Who this person was is not known.

self is rare and reported only once. 1
reported, the name is unknown. 2
The oases can be extended.3

The name it-

Kattarias however is not

There are, however, some in-

teresting possibilities that deserve to be mentioned.
son of Ba.simion who cannot be otherwise identified.

Hegestratus,
The letter

forms and the circumstances of the finding of the one of two ostraca with hie name indicate a date in the early fifth century.
certain Hegestratus was Archon in 559/8 B.C.

A

As the name is a

rare one, it is not improbable that Archon Hegestratus is a descendant, perhaps a grandson of our Hegestratus,

4 who was politically

active in the early part of the century.
Three ostraca of the early fifth century mention Melanthius Phalanthou.

The nature of the ostraca are common to the early

fifth century.

According to Berodotus,5 Melanthius waa the name

ot the leader of the Athenian fleet of twenty ships dispatched to
Miletus in 498 in support of the Ionian revolt.

The ostraca

therefore may refer to him. 6 The 480•s will be the logical period
1

~.

2

~. for the details of this excavation.

3see Appendix, pp. 117-122.

4Vanderpool, op. cit., pp. 399-400.
6vanderpool, op. cit., p. 400.
5Hdt V, 97,3.
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of the ostraca since the other pro-Persian leaders were ostracized
during this time.

That means that the war party of Miltiades and

Themistocles had cause to be displeased with the performance of
Melanthius during the Ionian revolt.

Of course, it could also be

that Melanthius belonged to the appeasement party in the 490's and
48o•s.

This exacerbated further the feelings of the war party

against him.
The name most frequently mentioned on the ostraca found so
far is the name of Themistocles.

This is only befitting the na-

ture of this intriguing man who was fina.117 ostracized in the late
seventies of the fifth century. l

Themistocles' ostracism in 472-1

was hardly the first attempt made to oust him.

His turbulent

political career as the leader of the popular party and his violent and wily nature brought him into constant clash with the opposing groups headed by men like Hipparchus, Megacles, Xa.nthippus,
and Aristides who all went to excile in the 480•s largely with the
aid of the machinations of Themistocles and the war group.

Ostraca

1There is no absolute certainty for the date of his exile.
One opinion based on Thuc7dides (I, 137) is that he was ostracized
about 472 ..1 that the charge of complicity with Pausanias was
brought against him about 466 and that he fled to Persia about
465, the year in which Artaxerxes succeeded Xerxes. From the evidence o! Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 25, 3-5) on the other hand, it ap.
pears that he was in Athens in 462, and his ostracism cannot be
consequently placed earlier than 462 and his flight to Persia
about 460. This is irreconcilable with the statement of Thucydides (I, 137) tha~ in his flight was almost seized by the Athenians engaged in the siege of Naxos which is generally assigned to
the year 466 and most critics reject Aristotle's version. Oscar
Broneer, "Excavations on the Borth Slope of the Acropolis, ..
Hesperia, VII (1938), 242-24}. See C. A. Robinson, Jr., "The
Date of Themistocles Ostracism," ~' LXVII (1964, 265-266.
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bearing his name were found also in a well alongside with those of
Aristides, 1 which means that he was a candidate along with Aristides.
Kallixenos' name, son of Aristonymua from the deme of
Xypete, appears on no less than 251 ostraca.

He thus ranks second

only to Themistocles as the statesman whose name appears most frequently on the ostraca discovered up to 1950. 2

All of the ostraca

of Kallixenus were found in the Agora but not all come from a single deposit.

The wide spread of the ostraca and the large numbers

indicate that we deal with a man very active in the political affairs of the city, for whose ostracism a concerted campaign must
have been conducted in the ecclesia.

In only a few instances the

name of Kallixenus appears alone on an ostracon.

In the great

majority of sherds the name is accompanied by the patronymic,
Aristonimou.

On

one ostracon (Nr. 29) the voter has scratched a

head in a profile to the right, a head with a wreath and a long
pointed beard.
in three lines

To the right on the head the name has been written
Ka:A.A.1.(xoc;v)o~

without the patrary.mic.

The ques-

tion then can be posed:

Who was he?

many votes against him?

There seems to be no question about his

date.

When did he live and why so

Many ostraca have been found in the same deposit along with

oatraca of Aristides, Themistocles, and Hippocrates son of Alcmeonids, to mention only a few.
1

Vanderpool, after close study of the

Broneer, "Excavations on the North Slope of the Acropolis," op. cit., pp. 242-243.
2George Stamires and Eue;ene Vanderpool, "Kallixenos the
Alkmeonid, 11 Hesperia, XIX (1950), 376.
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rectangular rock-cup in which the ostraca were found, attempted to
fix the date as closely as possible.
may have been one of the principal

11

He suggested that Kallixenus
candidates" for ostracism in

483, though votes may have been cast against
sions. 1

hill on other occa-

To Professor Vanderpool it seems probable that the major-

ity of the ostraca on Kallixenus date from the ostracism of 482. 2
Another ostracon 3 gives evident that enables us to identify his
The clan or family is (ALK) meon (idou).

family.

He therefore be-

longs to the great and well-known family of the Alcmeonids.

From

other sources we know that the name Aristonymus was borne by the
grandfather of Agariste of Sicyon who was married into the Alcmeonid family in an earlier generation. 4 The use of the name of a
Sicyonian forebearer would be quite a normal parallel in the case
of Kleisthenes, the legislator.

The precise place of Aristonymus

in the Alcmeonid family is not sure, but he could have been an unknown younger brother of Cleisthenes5 who had established himself
in Xypete some time before the reform of

5o8/7. There is another

alternative that he may be connected with the female line.
Before I close this short excursion into the turbulent

1H. A. Thompson, 11 Excavationa in the Athenian Agora:
1959," Hesperia, XIX (1950), 396-399.
2

~. Thompson, Hesperia, Supplement IV, op. cit., pp.
32-33· Carcopino,-op. cit., P• 150. QA!!, IV, 153 tor the date of
Aristides ostracism.

24.

3'1'hompaon, Hesperia, Supplement IV, op. cit., p. 32, fig.
4
Hdt VI, 126,1.

5stamires and Vanderpool, op. cit., p. 378.
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period of 510-480, I would like to mention briefly the problem of
Alkibiades the so-called Elder, who was supposedly ostracized in

485 after Megacles.

The whole argument has risen from the short

and unclear statement of Aristotle, "that for three yea.rs they
exiled the friends of tyrants, on account of whom the ostracism
was intended." 1
reasons.

The statement is lacking in clarity for several

Aristotle does not say how Megacles and Hippocrates

were friends of the tyrant.

He

names the two ostracized persons

but does not name the third, if, that is, the Athenians ostracized three persons in three consecutive years.

Further, he does

not explain if he means that the interval between the ostracism
of Hipparchus and that of Megacles was three years, let us say
from 488 to 486, with no one for 487.

The situation has produced

a great deal of conjecturing, but there is no safe way to establish clear historicity of the facts to date.

Vanderpool rejects
the notion of the exile for the Elder Alkibiades in 487. 2 He

suggests two other possibilities for the year.

Archaeological

evidence indicates} that Boutalion of Marathon and Hippocrates,
son of Anaxileos, were both candidates for ostracism in the middle
48o•s.

He rules out Boutalion as an insignificant upstarter. This

leaves Hippocrates, the sone of Anaxileos, an aristocrat perhaps
1

Ath. Pol• 22,6.

2:E.

Hes~eria,

Vanderpool, "The Ostracism of the Elder Alkibiades,"
XXI (1952), 4.

-1:.

Vanderpool, H!fhe Rectangular Rook-cut Sha.ft,tt Hesperia,

xv (1946), 272.

105

connected with the great Alcmeonid family directly or indirectly.
It may well have been then that he was the victim of ostracism in

485 following Megacles in exile.

If such is the case then Aris-

totle's statement above may be taken to mean that in three consecutive years the Athenians banished three alleged friends of the
tyrant.
The ostracism of Alcibiades is not, however, certain.
Outside of the archaeological evidence 1 we have also written evidence.

2

Andocides claims that Alcibiades the Younger's both grand-

fathers were ostracized.

If one allows about thirty years per

gen~

eration, Alcibiades' grandfather must have been a ripe man in the

480 s and probably active in politics like many members of the
1

prominent families of Athens.
a probability.
conjecture.

Hence his ostracism in the 480 1 s is

The exact year of his exile remains nevertheless a

Unfortunately Aristotle's evidence is not clear enough

to clarify matters.

The reasons for the so-called Alcibiades

Elder's ostracism are not given.

If one accepts Alcibiades as the

third consecutive person to be ostracized in the 480 1 s and Aristotle's nebulous statement that the Athenians exiled for three
years the friends of the tyrants, then Alcibiades along with the
other Alcmeonids had supported the family's policy vis-A-via Persia.
Andocides states that both grandparents' activities were reprehensible.

"Not even he himself would have dared say, that they (his

1 vanderpool, 11 The Ostracism of the Elder Alkibiades," 2E.:.
cit., P• 4.
2Andocides, Against Alcibiades, 34.

-
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grandfathers) were not violators of the law. 111

This clearly re-

fers to their public actions, political activities to be specific,
2
since there was no law of ostracism for moral crimes.
But what
was it exactly for which they have been condemned?
does not specify.

Andocides

And so the controvers1 continued.

~. Translation is mine.
2 KaC µDV ouo'&v av~6, lnLXELp~OELEV &v~L~Etv,
~' ob ~~v ~AAwv iKEtvoL napavoµ~~a~oL 5v~£, •••

1

For Andocies' interpretation of ostracism see

~.,

p. 35.

EPILOGUE
There has been a strong streak of moderation running
throughout the entire gamut of Greek political histo1'7•

Man1 of

the enduring political acts of the Greeks were mainl1 due to the
moderation that prevailed at man1 critical junctures of Greek
political life.

The reforms of Solon were the product of a polit-

ically moderate man who composed his changes in the spirit of temperance.

Solon might not have been able to satisfy all parties

concerned, but his work found acceptance because of its temperate
nature.

Pisistratus' "tyrannical" regime was tolerated at the end

exactly because hie t1ranny was not really tyrannical, in the
strict interpretation of the word.
mild and moderate.

His government proved to be

Pisistratus died in his bed.

The general con-

sensus among ancient and modern historians of Greek affairs is that
his period was a period of positive returns in Athenian political
history.

Pisistratus has been universally praised in spite of the

fact that he was a usurper and his role was unconstitutional.
Cleisthenes' reforms were written in the same vein of moderation
that distinguished the periods of his two predecessors, Solon and
Pisistratus.

The result was that Cleisthenes• political acumen

paid dividends.

His constitution became the basis of the Athenian

state during the most glorious period of its history.
There was, on the other hand, an overwhelming trend of
political irrationality, political fanaticism, and blind extremism.
It manifested itself constantly in Greek life and disturbed deeply
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the normal processes of the political functions of the Athenian
city-life and for that matter practically all of Greek city-life,
with the exception of Sparta.

This extremism was chiefly due to

the emotional character of the Greek citizen.

The Greeks failed

repeatedl7 to harness their emotions for the sake of moderation
and reason.

As it often happens in such cases, the entire commu-

nity suffered from the erratic political malady.

The common man

was hurt as often as were the political leaders.

In a puerile

fashion, the common voter refused to accept his share of responsibility for decisions which were freely debated and commonly resolved in the ecclesia.

Consequently, the leader who rode high

on the popular wave yesterday found himself the next day deprived
of his office and power and was expelled for ten years of his life
or variously punished and ridiculed.

The Athenians resorted to

such extreme measures not for any major constitutional violation,
omissions, or deceits bUt for proposals and bills passed openly by
the sovereign body of the ecclesia only because these bills did
not always measure up to the expectations of the bill's sponsor
and the voting assembly.

The political leaders themselves were

not entirely innocent of the sanctions imposed upon them by the
immature citizenry because they inflamed the voters when they
should have been soothing them.

They exhibited the eame weaknesses

that the man on the street did, when they were expected to lift
themselves above the shortsightedness of the common m:an.
The political imbroglios of the period following Solon's
reforms led to the unconstitutional solution of Pisistratus' re-
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gime because this regime provided an alternative to the exaaperating behavior of the political factions of the Solonian democracy.
Pisistratus provided a break-through in the stalemate to which the
Solonian democracy had fallen.

Be seemed to be able to get the

state business moving again after the impasse to which the state
had been forced because of the political anarchy and chaos which
had been brought about by the constant squabbling of the political
parties.

Pisistratus struck roots because he used power with mod-

eration.

His sons were removed from office because they resorted

to political repressions.

But Isagoras who succeeded Hippias be-

came guilty of acts of political extremism.
rule of moderation.
office.

He ignored the golden

As a result, he, too, was soon removed from

The incident served to teach Cleisthenes a lesson.

thenes, undoubtedly, capitalized on Isagoras' errors.

Cleis-

His middle-

of-the-road reforms created the climate of political tranquility
which was so badly needed for the absorption of Cleisthenes' measurea.

Unfortunately, the political tranquility did not last very

long.

New issues appeared which stirred up the Athenians.

Some

of these issues were concerned with foreign policy on which depended the viability of the Athenian Democracy--indeed the survival of
the whole of Greece.

The Athenians encountered these problems

with the same lack of common sense and the same deep passions
had marred their political existence earlier.

wh~ch

A new set of politi-

cal leaders employed the issues of the day to arouse the excitable
Athenians.

Old personal hatreds, petty jealousies, emotional
'

over~

reactions were now intertwined with vital internal and external
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lems which fanned the people's political fanaticism.

In their

anger, the Athenians turned to a dormant political weapon, ostracism, and, as usual, they made excessive and abusive use of it.
Ostracism was originally invented to protect the constitution from
would-be violators.
the weaker.

Now it was used by the stronger to eliminate

It was thus turned against excellence while leaving

mediocrity to reign supreme.

It is a wonder that the Athenians

were able to weather the crises of the 490's and the 48o•s as admirably as they did.

This feat was due to a great extent to a

political leader who finally suffered from the same excesses that
he had imposed upon others earlier.

His case was a flagrant exam-

ple of the case that I have tried to build in this paper.

The man

who saved Greece in her hour of peril almost singlehandedly fell
victim to that fanaticism so characteristic of the Greeks.
The Athenians, like the rest of the Greeks, never managed
to reach that point of political maturation and composure that
would have enabled them to develop their political history in a
gradually ascending manner.

Because of this weakness, they were

never able to evolve some comprehensive political forethought and
plan which would have made their life easier and their hold in the
geographical area stronger.

Had they matured politically with the

lapse of time, the history of the Ancient Near East might have
taken a different turn.

APPENDIX
Supplementary Note A
Vanderpool 1 discusses a sherd found with the name of
Pisistratus inscribed on it.
geometric piece.

The sherd was an eighth-century

The filling in which it has been found says

nothing helpful toward its identification.

Professor Vanderpool

thinks that it could belong to the mid-sixth century, referring
to Pisistratus the tyrant.

Pisistratus went to exile on two occa-

sions, and it may be that he was banished by a vote of the Areopagus. 2

Areopagus would be in this case the logical body to ban-

ish Pisistratus, since it was charged under the Solonian Constitution with the duty of protecting the laws and particularly with
trying persons who conspired to overthrow the democracy.3

Since

there is no mention of a military coup for the overthrow of Pisistratus, the expulsion must have been done in some legal form, the
voting being done on sherds, one of which has been bequeathed to
4
us by coincidence.
The name Aristion appeared on another early sherd.

It is

1

vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora," 2l?.:.
cit., P• 407.

-

2

Bdt I, 60,1.

3Ath. Pol. 8.

c

Atp. Pol• 14,3,

c
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vou~ ~~pi.vc:v, ~6Awvo~ ~tv'to~ voµov c:taa:yyc:A.(a:~
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4

ill••

Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora, 11 2l?.:.

P• 407.
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worth recalling that a man named Aristion was one of Pisistratus'
supporters, and that it was on his motion that the people voted
Pisistratus the bodyguard, which paved the way for the first tyr1

If Pisistratus was exiled, it seems sure that such a supporter would have been exiled along with the tyrant. 2

anny.

l

Ath. Ppl. 14,1. How and Wells, OE• cit,, P• 82.
2Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora, 11 21?.:.
cit., P• 407.

-

Supplementary Note B
Eukrates.

It is not altogether known if the sherd bearing

his name is an ostracon.

The name cannot be identified with cer-

tainty, but he may possibly be Eukrates the father of Diodotus who
spoke in defense of the people of Mytilene in 427 B.C. 1

The letter

forms suggest a date in the first half of the fifth century, though
rather improbable that he was a candidate for ostracism in the
480 1 a.

It would be too early a date. 2
1

Thuc. III, 41.

2Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora,n 21?.:.
cit., p. 400.

-

Supplementary Note C
Hierokl---Herma- The name cannot be easily identified.
could be Hierokles or Bierokleidea.

Letter forms and circumstances

suggest a date in the early fifth century and probably ill the
48o•s. 1 His father's name also is unidentifiable.
1

n.li•t P•

400.

It
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Supplementary Note D
Kritias Leaidou is another name that cannot be easily
identified.

The circumstances of finding one of the ostraca with

his name show that he was active in politics in the 48o•s of the
fifth century.

The name Kritias is not a common name.

It has

been reported from only two Athenian families, Plato's family on
his mother's side, 1 and Kritias of Aphidnai, father of Apolodoros,
who was one of the treasurers of Athens 432/1. 2 It does not seem
possible to connect our Kritias with either of the above.

Supplementary Note E
Laispodias of Koile.

The name is a common one. 1

Baubit.

schek suggested that this La.ispodias is the sone of Spudis who
made a dedication on the.Acropolis.
nal evidence for this.

There is, however, no exter-

Letter forms and circumstances indicate

the first half of the fifth century as a date of the ostracon.
date in the 480 1 s is quite appropriate. 2
1 A Raubitschek cited~., p. 400 ftn. 19.
2

~·t P• 400.

A
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Supplementary Note F
Table of Ostraca found at the Agora in 1947:
Acharnion Xypetaion

l

Alkibiades Cleiniou Skambonides
(the elder)

1

Arist. Lysimachou Alopekethen

4

Charias Ph--dou (A---+

1

Habron Patrocleous Marathonios

2

Hippocrates Alkm. Alopehethan

42

Hippocrates (uncertain)

11

Hyperbolus Antiphanius (Perithoides)
Kallixenus Aristonymon Xypetaion

1

148

Kallixenus (?) Kleisthenous

l

Kleisthenes (?) Aristonymou

1

Megacles Hippocratous Alopelethen

2

Themistocles Neocleous Phrearriua

158

+This name from letter form and circumstances auggests that the person was active in the early fifth
century.

Not similar to Paianieus.
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